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This paper is in no way meant to be a comparative study
of the two Napoleons. The methods and strategies of Napoleon I
are given merely as background material to 1870. Napoleon I
was not perfect in his use of the tools and techniques of his
profession, particularly during the later campaigns. Yet the
fact remains that Bonaparte probably possessed one of the most
outstanding military minds in history and used it to help
France reach her pinnacle of power in Europe during the early
19th century. The question to be answered is how this same
nation could be so quickly and thoroughly beaten a little more
than fifty years later, in 1870. One of the obvious answers
seems to be that France in 1870 lacked a military leader of
the stature of Napoleon Bonaparte. But other questions arise.
For example, given the lack of an outstanding military leader
in 1870, what had happened to the military formula with which
Napoleon I had successfully dominated Europe? During the
preceding years, how had the French leaders built and advanced
the Napoleonic tradition and strategy? In addition, it is
necessary to take at least a surface look at their opponents,
the Prussian military. How had the Prussian leaders been
affected by their defeats in 1806 at the hands of Napoleon I?
Had it been these defeats that encouraged the Prussian leaders
to develop new tactics which they were to use against the
French in 1870?
These, then, are a few of the aspects which must be con-
sidered in a historical analysis of the reasons for the fail-
the French military in 1870,

NAPOLEONIC ARMIES
The most distant cause of the French defeat in 1870
probably occurred in 1806, Not only had Napoleon I en-
couraged the growth of German nationalism with his policy
toward the Germanic states, but he had showed the German
leaders, particularly the Prussians, the methods which were
necessary to continue national sovereignty, lliroughout the
early Napoleonic Era, Prussia, under Frederick William in,
had successfully kept its neutrality; but when in 1806 it
was discovered that an aggressive Napoleon I had other plans
for the Prussian state, making it a satellite in reality,
friction between the two powers resulted in war.
At this time the Prussian army was a perfect example
of how 18th century armies trained and organized. The organ-
ization of the Prussian army was based on the well-disciplined,
long-serving soldier led by army officers who in many cases
had strong faith in a defensive style of fighting. This
Prussian army in 1806 opposed a French national army which,
on the whole, was led by those having patriotic feelings and
an officer corps which believed in quick, thrusting offenses.
Napoleon used the technique of the sudden stroke into the
enemy's weak area, which he had previously perfected in Italy
1
and Austria against the Prussians in 1806.
1, Ferdinand Schevill, A History of Europe
. New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1951, p. 433. Here
after cited as Schevill, Europe
.
4.
In general, the excessive emphasis on one type of
strategy has often proven disastrous. This was the case of
the Prussian leaders in 1806, when they failed to remain
flexible enough to alter their plans to fit the changing
conditions of the various situations they faced. Prince
Louis at Saalfeld, and Tauentzien near Jena, both made defeat
xnevitable because they insisted on imitating the oblique'
order of battle of Predericlc the Great. The Prussians at
this time did not consider numerical superiority a prereq-
uisite for Victory while Napoleon had earlier used the prin-
ciple of superiority of numbers very successfully and thus
had great faith in it. At Jena. October 14, 1806. Prince
Hohenlohe mistakenly decided to oppose Bonaparte's 65,000
men with his army of 35,000. Almost complete destruction
resulted and the Prince could no longer be considered in
3
command of a fighting force.
In 1807 a treaty was signed between Napoleon and Prus-
sia in which the latter became a virtual satellite, Prussia,
as a result, lost half of its territory, had to pay a huge
indemnity, had to pay for the occupation of French troops,
2. Oblique movement into battle means that the attacking
torce moves in a direction that is diagonal to its
column movement, thereby making the point between
Its tlank and front its first assault element.
3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War
. London: Paul, Trench, TrubnerCompany, Vol, I, 1940, pp. 129, 196, and 258. Here-
atter cited as Clausewitz, On War.
5,
and was forced to lindt its military forces to 43,000 men/
The period from 1806 to the French retreat from Russia
in 1812 gave many of the Prussian leaders the time to re-
examine their defeat of 1806. These leaders eventually got
the conservative William III to agree to certain social and
political reforms. These reforms, first led by stein and
later by Hardenberg, abolished feudalism and led to much
greater social mobility. Thig also resulted in a reorgan-
ization of the army along lines similar to the French army.
This reorganization resulted in universal conscription and
the lessening of the extreme use of discipline. A national
militia, the Landwehr, which allowed the Prussians to put
over 200,000 troops in the field to oppose Napoleon I at
6
a later date, was also created in 1813. Even though
Napoleon had limited the Prussian army to 43,000 men, the
Prussian leaders, led by Scharnhorst, were able to circumvent
this ruling by replacing the entire 43,000 men with an en-
tirely new army each time the first group had successfully
7
completed the minimum requirements of training.
4. F. E. Whitton, The Decisive Battles of Modern Times
.
Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1923, p. 63.
Hereafter cited as Whitton, Decisive Battles
.
5. Landwehr literally means "landguard" and was made up
basically of most men who had served in the army
and reserve and were still under 45 years old.
6. Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640-
1945
.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1956,





Not all the credit should be given to Napoleon for his
frequent victories because he often benefited from the errors
and mistakes of his opponents. Similar to the Prussian
mistake at Jena in 1806, was the Austrian failure in 1809
to reinforce their troops after the battle of Aspern. since
the Austrians could have brought three times as many reinforce
ments into the field as Napoleon did during this interval
period, their failure to do so proved a great disadvantage
during the battle that followed at Wagram.
In both the battles of Ratisbonne and Wagram, Bonaparte
vigorously attacked with his right wing, leaving his left
wing to hold a defensive position. Although Archduke Charles
of Austria used the same tactics, he lacked the stubborjiess
and vitality of Napoleon»s forces, and thus the few units
which gained their objectives were nothing when compared to
the decisive victories of Napoleon's right wing. During the
battle of Wagram the Austrians attacked Bonaparte's weak left
flank with the majority of their forces. Meanwhile his right
wing successfully defeated and turned the Austrian left flank.
With strong reserves to the rear, he prevented the Austrian
successes on his left side from hindering his total victory
by his right wing at Rossbach. Later he combined his forces
8
to re-take Aderklaa, which had been lost by his left flank.
8o Clausewitz, On War
.
Vol. Ill, pp. 217, and 187-189.
7.
Napoleon I«s plan for a march into Russia in 1812
might seem imprudent on the surface, but this was not the
case. His plan for defeating the Russian armies and finally
occupying their capital of Moscow would, he believed, ul-
timately force the Emperor Alexander to sign a peace treaty.
This had proven to be the case with the Prussians after the
battle of Friedland in 1807, and again with the Austrian
Emperor Francis after the battle of Austerlitz in 1805, and
later after the battle of Wagram in 1809. Although Napoleon
knew the chance he was about to take might lead to a strat-
egic defeat, he was fully aware of the precedent that had
been established and, therefore, took the gamble he felt
necessary. Wapoleon»s character and previous actions
could have offered enough foreshadowing reasons why he
might have accepted this favorable gamble.
This calculated risk resulted in Napoleon's defeat
in Russia and in addition after 1812 the allies, not in-
cluding Russia, could put approximately 725,000 troops in
the field to oppose Napoleon. France at any time during
the First Empire did not have that number of troops under
arras. By late 1812 only one- third of Napoleon's troops were
French, while the majority had been recruited from the
10
countries he had occupied.
9. Clausewitz, On War
.
Vol. I, p. 149.
10. Clausewitz, On War
. Vol. Ill, p. 171.
8.
Dur^ing most of Napoleon's marches, with the major ex-
ception^the march to Russia in 1812, his troops seldom
suffered from lack of provisions, since they would often,
as in the march from the Adige to the Lower Danube, take
whatever they needed from the countryside.
Besides relying on the ability of his troops to find
provisions. Napoleon depended upon his advance guard a great
deal. Since he needed to alter his tactics from time to
time, it was necessary for the advance guard to provide the
information needed. Aside from this, Bonaparte made the
ma:ximum use of his advance guard to keep comraunications
open among his many units. His use of cavalry in this
manner was quite extensive, but he seems to have depended
a great deal more on having greater numbers of infantrymen
rather than cavalrymen, for ultimate victory in battle. Once
his cavalry had been started into the attack they could not
be maneuvered and usually became wasted after attacking for
12
more than 1500 yards.
On the other side, Napoleon oft-n used his artillery
whenever possible. Kis success at massing and concentrat-
ing his artillery often depended upon the type of terrain
13
and the accuracy of his shells at a range of about 300 yards.
11. Clausewitz, On War
.
Vol. II, p. 93.
12. Ibid., pp. 21, and 42-43.
13. Ibid ., p. 22.
9.
During the era of Napoleon I the moveraent of artillery to a
more desirable position would often depend on the firmness
of the earth, thereby allowing the field pieces to be moved
into position. For this reason Napoleon was unable to break
through the British lines at Waterloo/^
Bonaparte frequently waited for the course of a battle
to develop before he committed his artillery, in this way
he could move the massed pieces to the desired location
with the result that the artillery then became the decisive
factor of the battle. Tlie opposite of this tactic was the
combination of massed concentrated artillery that Napoleon
used to stop or hinder the advance of an enemy by a heavy
bombardment, thereby giving his troops the time to decide
the right opportunity for victory. The allied leaders
were sometimes slow to learn from the old master, but in
the battle of Leipzig when their massed guns surprised
Napoleon by opening fire, he commented, "At last they have
15
learned something."
It becomes obvious that Napoleon, during his later
campaigns, lost much of the zest and detailed precision that
he had earlier shown. At this time he began to rely more on
his own ability to master his opponents. At Kulm, in August
1813, he ordered Vandamrae's column, unsupported, to cut off
14, Clausewitz, On War
. Vol, I, p, xi.
15, Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe Ingelfingen, Letters on Art-
illery
.
London: Stanford, 1893, pp. 130, and 127-
128, Hereafter cited as Hohenlohe, Artillery ,
10.
the retreat of the Prussians and Austrians from Dresden,
The French column was destroyed because Napoleon had for-
16
gotten about it.
It seems that after 1806 Napoleon I used his imperial
position to guarantee his greater numbers on the battle
field. This reliance on numerical superiority resulted
in his emphasis on the sheer weight of his forces rather
than using the surprise and mobility he had used earlier.
This tactic can be observed when he later emphasizes con-
centrated artillery fire to soften a point in his adversary's
defenses before he launched his attack. His final defeat may
have been caused by his failure to be frugal with his super-
ior numbers, and his failure to make use of surprise and
mobility, Bonaparte's strategy of attacking an enemy's weak
spot had been established much earlier, but Napoleon's
later dependence on the massing of enough troops to make
a weak spot in his opponent's defensive line was a corrupt-
ion of this military principle. The real power of concent-
rating a force at an enemy's weak point lies in the use of
a flexible policy of mobility and not merely in the density
of one's troops. The loss of this flexibility on the part
of Napoleon I has been greatly overlooked and hidden by
17
what later grew to be the Napoleonic legend.
16, Clausewitz, On War , Vol, I, p, 219,
17. Liddell Hart, The Ghost of Napoleon , New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1935, pp. 102-103, Hereafter
cited as Hart, The Ghost.
11.
The Prussians during the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen in 1913
put into the field a well-disciplined array of 150,000. After
these engagements Napoleon considered the Prussian troops
his most dangerous rivals and by the importance their role
played in his defeat at Leipzig it would seem that his
prophecy was well founded.
Yet when the Prussian and Russian armies met Napoleon
at the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen in May, 1813, he suc-
cessfully won both engagements because of his own great
military prowess. The fact remained, however, that he
fully realized that these defeats were in no way similar
to the crushing defeats of Jena and Friedland. The oppos-
ing forces retreated in an orderly fashion and Napoleon
commented that with the great losses of the French^a few
more victories like those, would mean ultimate defeat for
19
France.
Thus, we have seen the very game of numbers^ that Napoleon
had played so well previously^ later being used against him.
The Prussians had learned their lessons well, and even though
there was a short period of Prussian reversal back to the old
tradition of a professional army, Prussia was again to apply
what it had learned at a later date, to its advantage. In
view of the German developments after 1806 it is interesting
18. Whitton, Decisive Battles , p. 63.
19. Schevill, Europe , p. 344.
12.
that the French, the first to use national armies in Europe,
fell back in 1870 to a complete reliance on the very thing
the Prussians found necessary to replace in 1806, the long
service soldiers of a professional army.
This lesson of Napoleon I, v.hich had been so quickly
absorbed by the Prussians in 1807, in general, was refuted
by many of the leading French military minds during the
1860's. One of the foremost French strategists of this period,
Ardant du Picq, was quoted as saying, "In these days of per-
fected long arms of destruction, a small force.... by a happy
combination of good sense or genius with morale or appliances,
may secure heroic victories over a great force similarly
armed. What good is an army of two hundred thousand men of
whom only one half really fight, while the other one hundred
20
thousand disappear in a hundred ways?"
To even the most casual reader it becomes evident that
if this view represented that of a sizable element of the
French military leadership in the 1860 's, which it did, the
conclusion could only be that they had not benefited from their
own historical experiences. The following material will con-
sider why both the French and the Prussians either adopted,
or failed to adopt, not only universal conscription, but also
various other technological and organizational developments
within their milit.ary organizations.
20. Edward M. Earle (ed.). Makers of Modern Strategy . Prince
ton: Princeton University Press, 1948, p. 215.
Hereafter cited as Earle, Modern Strategy.
13.
CHANGES FROM NAPOLEON I TO 1870
CHANGES IN PRUSSIA
It is incorrect to think that Prussia merely imitated
the military institutions of Napoleon I since, in reality,
they superimposed their existing military tradition on thi
Napoleonic system. Unlike the French during the years that
followed Napoleon Bonaparte, the Prussians after 1860 did
not allow the hiring of a substitute to take one»s place in
the army. They thus established the foundation of their
army upon the concept of true universal conscription.^^
Between 1815 and 1860 the law of universal conscription
was not stringently enforced in Prussia, but when William Ijami
came to power he saw the future necessity of war if Prussia
was to unite the various Germanic states. Because of this
William enlarged the yearly draft from 40,000 to 60,000 men
while stipulating that the minimum active service would last
for three years. After each soldier had served his active
time, he was expected to serve an additional two years in the
reserve. William I and Albrecht von Roon, Minister of War,
supported an increase in this reserve status to four years,
thus guaranteeing a Prussian army of 400,000 men. The lower
house of the Prussian Diet refused to support these military
A 22
retorms either fincTtially or legislatively.
21. A. V. Boguslawski, Tactical Deductions From the War of 1870
1871
.
Kansas: Spooner, 1878, p. 22. Hereafter cited
as Boguslawski, Tactical Deductions
.
22. James T. Shotwell
,
History of Western Europe
. New York:
Ginn and Company, 1946, p. 661, Hereafter cited
as Shotwell, Western Europe
.
14.
Despite this resistance, Bisraarck and von Roon, through
devious methods, went about reforming the military areas
they considered important while terrorizing many of the
Liberals in the parliament. This is just'^'^Spposi te of what
occurred in France, when during the 1860 »s the heads of
government gave concessions to the Liberals in the area of
military reform. With the support of William, Bismarck and
von Roon in Prussia continued their plan of strengthening
the array in complete defiance of the lower house. The final
step in these developments took place when General von Moltke,
one of the most scientific military minds of the 19th century,
took command of the Prussian array.
As with all other types of raachines, the military organ-
ization must periodically be overhauled to adjust to various
new developments. The armies of Frederick the Great were
found to be obsolete at Jena, and so too was Scharnhorst »s
organization during the mobilizations of 1848 and 1859,
Moltke helped to successfully bring about various needed
reforms in 1860, by making universal conscription the duty of
the entire nation. After the war against Austria in 1866, all
of the States in the Northern German Confederation with Bavaria
and Wurtemburg, adopted the Prussian military system and thus
23
set the basis for the standardization of one German array.
Thus the Prussian array stood ready; a large, well-oiled,
machine ready to lunge forward at the cotiiraand of its masters.
23. E, A. Altham, The Principles of War . London: Macmillan




At the start of the war in 1870, the Prussian general
staff, supporting the views of Moltke, intended, as much
as possible, to limit both Bismarck *s and von Roon's control
over the military movements during the conflict, Bismarck
was not even told of the German military plans after the
fall of Sedan, as a result, Bismarck later complained that
the Prussian military movements frequently hindered his
24
diplomatic dealings with the French, Moltke believed that
there was no reason why his military operations should be
interrupted by diplomatic considerations. The days were
gone when Napoleon I*s military officers were also "general-
diplomats", who received detailed accounts of military in-
25
formation.
Napoleon I had felt, when at all possible during times
of peace, as many military officers as possible should gain
combat experience with foreign armies. No matter how many
officers gained this experience those who did would prove to
be an asset in future campaigns. This was no t^necessary in
France during the Second Empire since its own foreign wars
provided a means for French officers to gain war experiences.
On the other hand, Prussia used this Napoleonic principle by
24, Gordon, Politics , pp, 204-205.
25, Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism . Greenwhich:
Meridian Books, 1959, p, 180, Hereafter cited
as Vagts, Militarism ,
16.
sending many of its officers, including von Moltke, to Turkey
and Syria, while von Goeben went to Spain to gain the nrac-
26
tical experiences of war. By 1870 these experiences proved
to be a limiting factor to the French tactics and style of
fighting, while having the opposite effect on the Prussians
and causing them to greatly advance their thinking in military
strategy.
Von Moltke, the Prussian comsiander, might be considered
the next military genius to come upon the European scene
after Napoleon I. There were many more similarities between
Moltke and Napoleon I than had ever existed between Napoleon
III and his uncle. Although Moltke never wrote of military
strategy as such, his brilliance was based on his search for
new developments in modern warfare. It was left for Moltke
to develop strategic timing as a newly formulated concept;
a systematical use of railroads for military use, the use of
the telegraph in war, a superior training system that em-
phasized the reliance on subordinate officers, and, finally,
the advantages of envelooment and concentric advance while
27
using increased range and ease of troop movement. Napoleon
I would probably have had some difficulty in developing the
emphasis on subordinate officers; but the rest of Moltke *s
developments were often the logical outcome of Bonaparte *s
26. Clausewitz, On War . Vol. I, p. 83.
27. A. L. Conger,"Moltke's Plans of Campaign," The Military
Historian and Economist . Vol. I, No. 3, July 1916,
p, 298, Hereafter cited as Conger, Moltke *s Flans .
17.
views Which concerned the bringing of a large part of his
force to bear upon only the minor force of his opponent,
and by massing the troops in a location in which they could
be quickly brought to bear in important positions on the
battlefield.
The Prussians had also started the development of a
general staff to work out geographical problems even before
1806. After their defeat at Jena, Scharnhorst led the re-
form that added supporting troops to this administrative
agency. During the period between the 1820 s and the late
1840 »s, the control of this staff remained in the hands of
the minister of war. Only under von Moltke did the full
possibilities of the general staff develop completely, cul-
minating finally with the separation of direct power of the
war ministry from the general staff. This division was not
entirely due to the brilliance of von Moltke, but was due
primarily to the fact that most Prussians realized the im-
portance of a centralized organization which could direct
the new technological innovations in times of stress- that
28
IS, use of railroads, and movement of artillery. When von
Moltke took command in 1857 he started to make detailed plans
as to how railroads could be used to their best advantage in
times of war. Through the structure of the general staff
28. Dallas D, Irvine, "The Origins of Capital Staffs," The
Journal of Modern History
.
Vol, X, No. 2, June
1938, p, 178, Hereaf ter cited as Irvine, Capital
Staffs,
18.
he organized a railroad system by 1867 that was entirely
independent of the regular system and could be used for
any purpose desired by the general staff.
The Prussian general staff, like Napoleon Bonaparte^
realized the importance of rifle power. Napoleon I had
established the principle: "The firearm is everything, the
29
rest is nothing," This comment summed up the Prussian
attitude toward rifle practice. The military leaders tried
to train the individual Prussian soldier so well in rifle
practice that, when he found himself under battlefield con-
ditions, he would not make some of the glaring errors that
had been made formerly, such as not even aiming at an enemy
assault force before firing.
The Prussian general staff planned the war with France
in great detail, yet the plan remained, to a large extent,
as flexible as possible due to the strong belief in change
by von Moltke. Von Moltke*s plan, as was agreed to by the
King, was, above all things, based on a quick capture of the
French capital, which he considered to be more important in
France than in most other countries. While the Prussian
troops were to drive the French forces toward Paris, they
were also to try to keep the French forces out of the fer-
tile southern states, while limiting them to a narrow tract
in the north as much as possible,
29. Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe Ingelfingen, Letters on In-
fantry . London: Stanford, 1889, p. 34, Kere-
after cited as Hohenlohe, Infantry ,
19.
The general theme of the German plan was based on the
resolution to attack the French at once, wherever they were
found, while trying to keep the German troops as completely
compact as possible so that the Prussians could always bring
a superior force into the field. These general plans were
usually left to the various commanders for decisions of the
hour. The most thorough part of the plan concerned the
Prussian advancement up to and through the French frontiers.
Moltke considered it a mistake to make any war plans
detailed on isolated points and then lay them away for any
length of time. He believed that the first meeting of the
two armies would change any preconceived plans, and there-
fore all action had to be based on the problems of the
times. As the situations developed he believed that some
things previously planned would become impracticable, while
others, though previously impossible^ might become possible.
As a result, Moltke thought that the^best he could do was
to weigh the facts and decide what was best for an unknown
30
period.
30. Helmuth von Moltke, Franco-German War of 1870-1871 .
New York: Harper Brothers Company, 1892, pp. 6-8,
hereafter cited as Moltke, Franco-German War.

20.
MATERIAL AND TECHi\OLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS
The French entered the war in 1870 with a railway system
which had been established between 1851 and 1855, The only
dealings that the military had had with the railroad com-
panies concerned financial matters. No plans had been made
for a system which would transport large numbers of troops
and supplies during war.
In 1869, General Niel appointed a commission to con-
sider possible reform of the rules that regulated railway
transportation for the military. The commission, made up
of both civilian and military personnel, designed a plan
for the coordination of the military and railway transport-
ation that was very similar to the German system of military
rail movement. Primarily due to the death of Niel, the plan
was virtually forgotten. Consequently, the French entered
the war in 1870 with a military transport system that had
been founded in 1855 and had already proven inadequate by
32
1859. auTifig t)»e Italian var.
A great deal of the chaos which resulted in 1870 was
due to the antiquated rules which had never been changed
since they had first been initiated in 1851 and 1855, For
example, one of the 1855 rules had stated that,"Officers
were responsible for the prescribed movements in connection
31, Edwin a, Pratt, The Rise of Rail-Power , Philadelphia:
J, B, Lippincott Company, 1916, p, 138, Hereafter
cited as Pratt, Rail- Power,
32, Ibid ,, p, 139,
21.
with the entraining, and should personally co-operate in
33
ensuring observance of the regulation referring thereto,"
but the fact was that many officers refused even to con-
sider this regulation as an aspect of their duties and re-
garded it as the responsibility of the railroad officials.
Even the great Prussian victory at Sadowa in 1866 did
not stir the French to reform and in fact it had the wrong
effect on the French public in general; their sole concern
was to show Prussia that France was still supreme in Europe.
After the impressive Prussian military victory at Sadowa,
a few of the French military leaders began to realize that
Prussia was considerably more than the perfect paper array
it had been considered previously. The alarm shown by
a few military leaders, however, still failed to arouse
the majority of the French military authorities and the
public in general. The French General Trochu, in his writ-
ings^showed that he had changed his opinion of the Prussian
army after Sadowa, but even his personal letters to the
Emperor failed to stir any reforms within the French army.
Both the French military attach^ in Berlin and General
Ducrot in Strasbourg, warned the French heads of government
of the huge number of reserves, the good equipment, and the
33. Ibid., p. 141, Napoleon I not only looked for new stra-
tegic developments, but one of the major facets of
his military genius was his quick movement of
troops to an opponent's weakness. Therefore, it
is quite improbable that during his early campaigns
Mapoleon could not have for^een the great possibil-
ities of railroads during periods of war. If noth-
ing else. Napoleon I certainly would have learned the
necessity of reform after the Italian lesson of 1859,
22,
excellent military organization of the Prussian army. These
continual warnings fell upon deaf ears, and the only response
from the general public, which was the only element who
could hare forced action to balance these inequalities, was
34"
an attitude of indifference.
One of the few changes that did occur in the French
array as a direct result of the Prussian victory in 1866 was
a greater emphasis on a new type of gun called the "chassepot".
This weapon, in many cases, was even superior to the Prus-
sian "needle gun" which was breech loading and had showed
its complete supremacy over the Austrian muzzle-loaders.
Both rifles allowed the soldiers to load them in any posi-
tion and could have had an even greater effect on the tactics
of both the French and Prussian military leaders if these
groups had not been so hesitant to abandon the old methods.
In addition, despite the superiority of their weapon, the
French failed to take advantage of this fact by not teach-
ing their troops how to effectively use these new arms.
These facts, combined with an exaggerated lack ot mobility,
greatly hurt the chances of a French military victory in
35
1870.
34. Arpad Kovacs, "French Military Institutions Before the
Franco-Prussian War," American Historical Review ,
No. LI, January 1946, p. 231. Hereafter cited
as Kovacs, French Military Institutions
.
35. Hart, The Ghost of Napoleon , p. 131,

23.
Because the Prussian breechloading artillery pieces were
accepted as being far better than the French muzzle loading
cannons, the French tried to counter-balance this advantage
with the use of a new weapon called the "mitrailleuse".
This weapon, a forerunner of the modern machine gun, had
thirty-seven barrels that fired simultaneously. Due to the
French fear that the new weapon might fall into Prussian
hands, only a small group of French officers were actually
acquainted with its function and possible use. The result
was that very few of these guns had been manufactured by
1870 and, as a result, they had little influence on military
strategy. The few "mitrailleuses" which were in use during
the fighting of 1870 were usually used as field cannons
rather than as infantry weapons which, if they had been
used correctly by the French, could have brought direct fire
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superiority to bear at close range.
The use of artillery to provide the best possible ad-
vantage had been a French tradition established during the
campaigns of the first Napoleon. During the war of 1870,
however, the artillery seemed, as did some of the other arms
of the French military, to rest more upon its past history
and tradition than upon i ts dcveUpioj p^eeUion. Not only were
36. Richard Preston, Sydney F. Wise, and Herman 0. Werner,
Men in Arms . New York: Praeger, 1962, pp. 250-
251. Hereafter cited as Preston, Arms
.
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the guns themselves imperfect weapons, but target practice
had been badly neglected. These two facts, combined with
the third fact that the French lacked a competent artillery
commander who could gain maximum effectiveness by maneuver-
ing for greater concentration of fire power, left the French
37
at a distinct disadvantage within the area of artillery.
Not only could the Prussian field pieces fire farther, but
they were also more numerous than the French cannons.
On the other hand^ the French artillery, had the good
qualities of quickly coming into position ana commencing to
fire very early. These facts were negligible in 1870 because
the French artillery had broken from the Napoleonic tradition
of massing the guns behind the infantry in order to cripple
various enemy positions of infantry and gun emplacements.
Instead, the artillery spread its weapons hoping to hinder
the enemy from deducing the proper range for its own gun
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emplacements. This meant that the enemy could not find
the correct range of the French artillery, but it also
meant that French fire power could not be direct and con-
centrated when it was most needed.
In the final 2Lnalysis, the French military frequently
broke with the best traditions of Napoleon I, while they
37. Boguslawski, Tactical Deductions, p. 31«
38. D, W. arogan, France Under the Republic . New York:




refused to discard many of his outdated ideas when it was
vital that such concepts should have been discarded.
At about the time the French dispersed their fire power,
von Molke began to emphasize concentrated fire after watch
ing the French in the Italian campaign in 1859. On the
other hand, when the French should have broken with the
Napoleonic tactic of moving into the attack by columns,
so as to take full advantage of the new "chassepot" rifle,
they failed to do so.
26.
CHANGES IN FRENCH MILITARY DOCTRINE BEFORE 1851
The French after 1814, in almost complete reversal to
the Prussian acceptance of universal conscription, returned
to the belief in a small professional army. Much of this
was the result of the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy
to the throne of France by the enemies of Napoleon I, Not
only did the monarchy have a distaste for Napoleonic military
tradition, but it also had no use for a large standing army
which might arouse the hostility of the various nations
which were providing the French monarchy with the support
necessary for it to remain in power, in any case it was
felt that a professional army could be relied upon for future
support much more dependably than could a large array with a
peasant base. This belief, which evolved from the conditions
of 1814, was to continue as the dominant French military
thought until 1870. The period from 1814, when the Bourbons
abolished universal conscription, until the revolution of
1848, saw little desire for a large standing array. Only
after 1848 was there any extensive feeling which realized
the necessity for a conscripted array based upon the common
man. This view was suppressed by Napoleon III who, during
the early part of his reign, relied completely on a well-
trained professional army. In the end, the "levee en masse"
that was born during the French Revolution of 1792
was quickly repudiated in the country of its birth in 1814.
27.
This is not to say that Napoleon I knowingly supported
universal conscription. In 1802, Napoleon continued the
policy of the Directory in allowing exceptions as long as
the individual could find someone to take his place. In
fact, he initiated another system of evasion by which all
individuals would draw lots, and the one who drew an unlucky
lot number would have to serve on active duty. Even this
system was found to be unnecessary and was eliminated when
39
Napoleon ended the "levee en masse" in 1805, Napoleon was
aware of the many advantages of a professional army but he
also fully realized the great need for superior numbers in
many victories. It was because of this second factor that
he found it necessary to gradually rely upon a large nation-
al array, rather than upon a small professional elite army.
Yet, Napoleon I had set out in 1805 to develop an elite
army which would follow him blindly. He replaced the
citizen soldiers, with their patriotic nationalism, with
the professional troopers who were well paid and well dis-
ciplined. In this instance, it could be argued that Napoleon
I established the foundation for France's national dependence
on a professional army. In the end, he could be considered
the father of both seemingly contradictory movements. On
one hand, he believed firmly in mass armies, because of his
great faith in the advantage of superior numbers, while,
on the other hand, he had a strong intellectual belief in
39. Kovacs, French Military Institutions , p. 219.
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an elite professional army. In any case, I^lapoleon saw the
necessity for the re-establishment of universal conscription
after his devastating defeat in Russia in 1812, As a result,
he extended this theory of a nation in arms from 1812 to
1815, During this entire three year period there develop-
ed a great hatred on the part of the French population for
military conscription. When the Bourbons abolished conscrip-
tion in 1814, its demise was popularly acclaimed.
After 1830, the increased fear of foreign invasion
forced the development of a system that doubled the 40,000
annual recruits which France was allowed by the law of 1818,
The law of 1832 divided the army into two groups: profes-
sional soldiers who served seven years, and another group
which did not serve any active duty at all but were to be
used as reserves for the regular array in case of a national
emergency. The law also provided a ruling that forced any-
one who had purchased his freedom with a replacement to do
so again if his replacement deserted. The morale of the
French army reached an all time low during the years follow-
40
ing the defeat of Napoleon I,
After 1814, the majority of the French leaders failed
to inspire the French military to any feats out of the
ordinary. The most positive period of the French military
40, Ibid , , pp. 220-221.
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between 1815-1851 occurred during the reign of Louis Phil-
ippe. During this interval the French armies were disciplined
and had several effective leaders. Later, when some of the
French leaders tried to revive the early Napoleonic traditions,
they found that the troops had lost one of the basic ingre-
dients of a good army, namely discipline. As an indirect
result, the military became a tool of the dominant French
party in power. The early period of the Second Empire was
centered on the glittering aspects of war, while most of the
necessary reforms were swept under the carpet. The military
of the Second Empire in no way changed its system to correct
the anachronisms, and^ the army which seemingly originated
as a national body, was, in the final analysis, based on a
41
small professional army.
Before the French Revolution, the French military lead-
ers had used the institution of the general staff, but it
was abolished in 1790. Under Napoleon I a general staff
was organized, but because of his own personality and military
brilliance. Napoleon did not use his staff extensively in any
42
area other than matters of supply.
After the Napoleonic era, the need for an effective
general staff became increasingly evident in order to make
41, Boguslawski, Tactical Deductions , pp. 23-24.
42. Irvine, Capital Staffs , p. 168.
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more effective use of the greater artillery power in the
fluid battle conditions which later developed. Although
Bonaparte had shown the need to make thorough preparations
for campaigns, it was the general staff of later years which
inherited this job, as well as that of creating an organ-
ization to handle the increasingly massive armies.
Prussian military leaders rapidly realized the ad-
vantages of the general staff, and made maximum use of the
organization. One of the greatest failures of the French
military heads in 1870, on the other hand, was their inability
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to realize the full potential of a strong general staff.
Napoleon III was probably the only individual in France
who could have brought about the needed reforms. Who was
this man. Napoleon I, in whose footsteps Napoleon III had to
follow? Napoleon I had as complete faith in his own military
ability, as Napoleon III had in his own ability to defeat
Bismarck diplomatically. :., : Napoleon and his namesake
were similar in the respect that neither could accept the
appearance of another popular figure upon the French scene.
The first Emperor would not let any military victories be
denied him, even if they belonged to a subordinate commander.
In contrast. Napoleon III, as he grew older, let the reigns
of power slip from his grasp. During his later years. Napoleon
III was seldom as vital a person as his uncle had been and
43, Freston, Arms, p, 248.
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probably would never have been moved to some of the rash
actions of Napoleon I. The first Napoleon was a classic
militarist who used any position which would give him the
military advantage, as opposed to Napoleon III*s lack of
general concepts and continual hesitancy to use force when
the possibility of defeat occurred. Napoleon I discarded
all rules when considering war and must be considered a
pragmatist to the core. Even though the Napoleonic blitz-
krieg tactics are well known, it is wrong to assume that
the inventor was foolish about these sudden thrusts. This
can be seen in the comments of an English officer who had
fought Napoleon I in Spain. "Row absurdly Napoleon has been
called a rash warrior, and one never thinking of retreat.
No man ever made bolder marches, but no man ever secured
his base with more care. Here, he would not suffer any
advance to fresh conquests until his line of communication
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had been strengthened." In reality, his unorthodox method
of brutal swiftness was combined with extreme care for
45
technical detadls and deep consideration of tactics.
Napoleon I, in all probability, would never have allowed
France's last chance of potential victory, an immediate
drive into the southern Germanic states, slip away because
of previous lack of planning and miscalculation, as Napoleon
III did in 1870.
44. W. F. Napier, War In The Peninsula
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CHAMGES DURING THE SECOl^iD EMPIRE
It is incorrect to assume that Napoleon Ill's seizure
of power in 1850 was viewed with disapproval by any sizable
element in French society. On many occasions during the
first years of the Second Empire the people overwhelmingly
voted for Napoleon III in either legislative elections or in
plebiscites. The last plebiscite of the early 1850 's found
7,800,000 voters approving of Napoleon's coup d'etat while
only 600,000 disapproved. However, this approval slowly
slid to the opposite extreme, particularly between 1863 and
1870, Although Napoleon's policies became more liberal, his
opposition increased in strength as he loosened control. The
more the government eased the laws of the press and public
meetings, the more the comraor man rebelled under the restric-
tions which remained. Finally, in 1870, a special commission
reported that the workers believed their conditions could
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only be improved by the fall of the Second Empire. Louis
Napoleon thus faced this dilemma during the latter years of
his reign. It is to his credit that he continued his liberal
ization policy in face of this growing opposition.
When Napoleon III came to power he not only inherited
the popular acclaim that had been his uncle's, but he also
inherited the diplomatic problems which the fitst Napoleon
had, to a large extent, created. In 1815 the allies tried
46, David I. Kulsten,"The Attitude of French Workers Towards
The Second Empire," French Historical Studies . Vol.
II, No. 3, Spring, 1962, pp, 359, 3Y3, and JVl.
33.
to guarantee the Germanic lands from ever again being in-
vaded by the French, The victors not only restored the
old 18th century Franco-German border, but they also extend-
ed Prussian influence in these frontier areas while establish-
ing a loose Germanic Confederation, with the hope that
Germanic resistance would be strong enough to resist any
future French invasion. This was a harsh blow to French
pride and influence. Thus, the peace of 1815 that grew out
of the Napoleonic struggle was to set the French pattern of
foreign policy for years to come. The view, held primarily
by the British, that order in the western Germanic states
would promote the peace of Europe, in actuality continually
chafed the French, and was viewed by them as a continuing
symbol of defeat. The friction concerning this border area
continued to exist even during Napoleon III«s administration,
and with even greater severity after 1870. Therefore, when
Napoleon III inherited the Napoleonic Legend he was also
forced to accept the responsibility of resuming the Napoleonic
policies with regard to the Rhineland, and regaining, by force
if necessary, the open door policy to western Germany, Napoleon
III sought to answer this problem by means of his policies
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throughout the 1860 »s. Because France could never accept the
47. Hermann Oncken, Napoleon III and the Rhine , New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1928, pp. 8-11. Hereafter cited
as Oncken, Napoleon III
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oeace of 1815 as a defensive measure, it watched vigilantly
for the opportunity to regain its old position in the Rhine-
land. In 1866, Napoleon III believed that Austria would
certainly defeat Prussia, or at least Prussia would have to
withdraw many of its troops from the Rhine area. With the
shock of Sadowa he was forced to bide his time. He weakly
tried to get Bismarck to agree to some concession in the
southwestern Germanic states in return for France »s neutral-
ity in 1866, Bismarck, of course, did not yield any con-
cessions to France and, in fact, allowed some of the south-
ern Germanic states to see Napoleon»s letter, thus driving
them into closer relations with Prussia. In this particular
instance it can be seen that Napoleon III lacked any of the
military genius of his uncle and, in the end, blundered in
the area he considered his personal forte, diplomacy.
Bismarck did not underestimate Napoleon IIl»s diplomatic
skills as some liiitorianx have done in the past. He con-
sidered Louis Napoleon a worthy opponent who upon occasion
was given to weakness. The Chancellor admitted only once to
being completely fooled by Napoleon^ and that incident occur-
red in 1866 after the battle of Sadowa, when Napoleon in-
dicated that if the Prussians entered the city of Vienna it
would automatically mean a declaration of war by France,
Bismarck stated,"! have never forgiven him for that, but,
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at any rate, he has been cruelly punished in his turn,"
The hatred that this incident stirred up in Bismarck seems
48. Henry Hayward, Bismarck In Pri vate Life. New York: Apple-
ton Co., 1890, p. 82. "HereaTter cited as Hayward, Bismarck.
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to shed more light on why, in 1870, he did not hesitate to
distort the Ems dispatch to his own advantage.
Many historians have, until recently, taken a hostile
position with regard to Napoleon in because they have judged
him primarily on the last major action of his reign, the
Franco-Prussian War. This tendency on the part of many authors
gives a distorted view of Napoleon III. His sometimes ad-
venturous, and eventually disastrous, foreign policy should
be viewed in relationship to the various pressures brought
to bear by the French public, and by the many political
factions and court intrigues which continuously demanded
military and diplomatic victories abroad, while none of
these elements within the French society desired to make
any sacrifices themselves.
It would seem that the foreign policy of Louis Napoleon
during the later stages of his reign was often carried out in
spite of public pressure. Finally, at the last of his crises,
Louis conceded to public opinion, and disaster resulted. If
these pressures were as great as some individuals believe,
then it becomes evident that a great portion of Napoleon III»s
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foreign policy was molded by his domestic needs.
Frequently, and not always with Napoleon's strong support,
various groups within the Second Empire demanded war as a
49. Alan B. Spitzer,"The Good Napoleon III," French Histor-
ical Studies
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means of furthering France's foreign policy aims. Three minor
wars, along with several isolated skirmishes, in various parts
of the world, were to form the foundation of the French
military attitude of self-confidence which was so prevalent
in 1870. Thus, the Second Empire's military tradition was
founded on a very weak basis as compared to that of the First
Empire in 1810, which had frequently beaten its enemies in
total struggles for survival, as compared to the inconsequent-
ial wars fought by the Second Empire up to 1870,
The first of these minor wars was the Crimean War which
broke out in 1854. Even though the large expedition of
French troops was not overly successful militarily. Napoleon
III succeeded diplomatically by his achievement of an alliance
with Great Britilji, At the start, the French tried to use
diplomacy rather than military force in handling the Crimean
situation. Because this diplomacy failed and Britain demand-
ed military action. Napoleon III could not readily refuse
the use of military force and as a result he was forced to
use an implement which he felt unnecessary.
During the first stages of the war, in 1854, the allied
armies of 50,000 met little opposition from the 35,000
Russian troops. As the war bogged down, however, the allied
victories became fewer. Because neither diplomatic nor military
victory occurred quickly enough, on February 16th, Napoleon III
announced that he would be forced to take supreme command of
the allied forces in person.
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As might be expected from past French military history,
the military operations of the Crimean war showed the true
valor of the individual French soldier, but it also inaicated
a completely inadequate military organization. Not only was
general strategy lacking, but many military leaders formed
views from these few isolated battles that would prevail
in 1870 and lead them to make severe errors in judgement.
Many of these military leaders were to make future decisions,
based on these and similar cases, in the years to come. For
example, the 30,000 French soldiers in the battle of Alma
sijj^ri singly found the cliffs they were to attack undefended.
After some difficulty they successfully climbed the cliffs
and arrived just in time to save the day for the English,
who were under heavy fire, by viciously attacking the Russian
flank. The haphazard manner in which this victory was achiev
ed for the allies indicated a complete absence of general
leadership and strategy that would rarely have been found
So
under Napoleon I, during the early stage of his career.
Again in the battle of Inkermann the French regiments
arrived not a moment too soon to prevent the Russians from
completely crushing the English, In fact, many English
historians call this battle "the soldiers battle" since the
lowly enlisted man made up for the lack of military strategy
on the part of the officers. Even the most decisive battle
50, Harold Murdock, The Reconstruction of Europe , Boston:
Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1890, pp, 56-57, Here
after cited as Murdock, Reconstruction,
38,
of all, Sebastopol, was started by a bursting bomb which was
mistaken for a signal flare and an entire assault of three
French divisions was launched before the necessary prepara-
tions had been made. This, of course, resulted in horrible
slaughter and great mass confusion. The fact remained that
the bravery of the French soldier time and again made up for
the knowledge his leaders lacked. At one point, the allied
troops were told to attack Russian gun positions on the cause-
way heights. Because of the great distance and the exposed
characteristics of the assaulting force few, if any, of the
attacking force reached the Russian artillery positions.
When they were met with reserve Russian cavalry wholesale
retreat resulted. The entire retreating body might have been
destroyed if it had not been for a brilliant and valorous
charge by the French 4th Chasseurs d«Afrique against the
Russian positions. This charge unnerved the Russian artillery
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long enough so that a retreat could take place. There was
never a question of the French soldier *s courage during the
Crimean fighting.
It must be reasoned that the Crimean war was, to a great
extent, the origin of much of Napoleon Ill's later success
in the field of foreign policy. Napoleon III had achieved the
goals that he sought when he had entered this war: *^ strength
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ening his hold on the throne and the Napoleonic legend. He




had successfully made an alliance with England and had forced
the entire world to recognize the supremacy of France on the
European continent,
Next came the Italian war in 1859 which hurt Napoleon»s
prestige at home, as well as abroad. The Catholic clergy
in France, who had previously supported Napoleon, turned
against him when it was realized that France »s support of
Italian unity would threaten the Vatican states. Napoleon
III was thus incapable of getting the continuous Catholic
support that his uncle had received from the Concordat of
1801. With its ally Sardinia, France was victorious in key
battles against the Austrians at Solferino and Magenta,
When Napoleon III saw the opposition to Italian unity that
existed in France he quickly withdrew and signed a separate
peace at Villafranca. One of the other facts that speeded
French withdrawal from the war was the fact that Prussia had
decided to send troops into the Rhineland, Napoleon III had
only 77,000 reserves in 1859 to counteract the Prussian move,
and at least 100,000 troops were necessary to balance the
situation. To his great embarrassment he found that he could
not even raise the additional 20,000 reserves and therefore
was forced to sign a peace with Austria quickly. In the end,
the war that had enhemced French prestige after its great
victory at Solferino ended in great embarrassment for France
throughout Europe, As a direct result of this incident
40.
Napoleon III ordered the second section of the inactive
53reserves to be given five months active training. This
training never took place for various reasons: lack of
facilities, trained instructors and lack of the necessary
military equipment.
The bravery of the French soldier was still in evidence
during the Italian campaign. This had been shown best in
hand to hand fighting with the bayonet which so amazed the
Austrians that the use of the bayonet became an important
technique taught by the Austrian army after 1859. The
critical eye of von Moltke did not make the Austrian mistake
for he fully realized the power lay^ not merely in the use
of the bayonet, but in the French soldiers' courage. For
this reason, the Prussian military training started to em-
phasize the accuracy of rifle fire power at a distance,
rather than the usual practice of firing one wild shot and
then quickly moving into close combat. In this way the
Prussians hoped to cause a great many enemy casualties be-
fore any hand to hand fighting could occur in actual combat.
Even though the possibility of a war with Austria had
been foreseen in France three years previously no great
effort was made along the lines of planning for it. The
same confusion that took place in 1854 occurred again in
53. Kovacs, French Military Institu tions , p. 222.
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1859, When the first French troops arrived in Italy they
lacked almost every type of equipment, which then had to be
borrowed from the Italians. The lack of planning was evident
when Napoleon III stated, "We have sent an army of 120,000
men into Italy before having stocked up any supplies there.
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This is the opposite of what we should have done." This
extremely poor military administration had existed in the
French army even during the era of Napoleon I but his own
military brilliance and his ability to regroup usually made
up for this lack of organization. It became evident in both
1854 and 1859, however, that there was no French general
who was brilliant enough to achieve what had been done from
1800-1814, Even though the French supplies and organization
had been poor during these two wars, French victory occurred
because their opponents' supplies and organizations were
even worse than their own. This, however, was not the case
in 1870,
France's third minor war during the Second Empire took
place in Mexico between 1862 and 1867, One of the most
important aspects of this conflict was that it greatly re-
duced the number of French troops in Europe, Consequently,
France could not aid Austria in its war against Prussia in
54, Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War , London: Rupert
Hart-Davis, 1962, p, 17, Hereafter cited as
Howard, The Franco-Prussian War ,
42.
1866 with anything other than moral support. Napoleon III
failed even v/ith war to extend French influence in the
Western Hemisphere, In this respect he failed as his uncle
had failed before him, but he realized the weakness of
committing a major portion of his best troops much less
quickly than had his uncle. In addition to realizing his
mistake earlier. Napoleon I had never committed crack troops
to any great extent in a Western Hemispheric adventure.
During the early 1860 »s, Juarez, the rebel leader, led con-
tinual guerrilla warfare against the French government which
was headed by Napoleon III»s puppet, Maximilian, There are
two important reasons for looking at the Mexican fighting
from a military standpoint. The first is that the type of
fighting which took place, guerrilla warfare, was to combine
with the French military experiences gained from the isolated
battles of the Crimean and Italian campaigns to fojpf the
military tactics they later used in 1870. In all instances
methods and tactics mattered far less than the valor and
capacity of the French soldiers. Had not the French army
successfully protected its military reputation in all cases?
In the wars against Russia anci Austria the French organization
was extremely poor while fighting and defeating comparatively
modern enemy armies, France's difficulties in the Mexican
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episode Should surely have stirred some afterthoughts in the
minds of the military leaders of France. These questions
bring us to our second reason for looking at the Mexican
war. Again the French were victorious, but the fact remain-
ed that some of their best troops had an extremely difficult
time in defeating, not the fairly modern Russian or Austrian
armies, but a motley group of Mexican peasants who were
untrained, ill-armed, and completely lacking in equipment.
Fighting against these soldier-farmers were some of the
best troops that France^lt her disposal. The following is
an account of what sometimes happened when these two forces
faced each other. "The 'beau fait d'armes' of the 99th
infantry regiment of the line consisted of a disastrous
assault against Guadaloupe Hill (May 5, 1862) during the
first attack on Puebla. This engagement took a heavy toll
of lives and the outcome forced the French to retreat to
Orizaba where they awaited reenforceraents."*'^ When the United
States ended its Civil War and demanded that France remove
her troops from Mexico, Napoleon m not only suffered
humiliation at the hands of the United States, but because
of the speed of the Prussian victory he had been unable
to deter the growth of Prussian power on the continent
with its growing military power.
.
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Although there had been many French military victories,
a few people in France did start to realize the shallowness
of these victories. There grew a restlessness within the
French public who criticized Napoleon III»s policies and
weakened his basis for popular support. If one accepts the
view that Louis Napoleon started to lose the popular support
of many Catholics in 1859, and various other groups later,
it becomes apparent that he instigated his policy of greater
liberalization in the 1860 »s in the hope of winning back
some of this popular support. It is questionable if the
plebiscite of May 8, 1870 indicated the popular support of
Napoleon III, or whether it instead endorsed his policy of
56
liberalization.
Previous to the outbreak of the war in 1870, Paris
seemed prosperous and content* to many outward appearances.
This facade of splendor misled many people, so that they
could not see the restlessness and popular discontent that
lay beneath the surface. This discontent, combined with the
physical disabilities of the emperor, weakened France a
great deal.
Napoleon III viewed this popular discontent with regret.
He felt that the French people were not only unfit for the
more liberal reforms he wanted to give them but that they
56. Schevill, Europe , p. 548,
In comparison, it is difficult for cinyone to picture
Napoleon I being pressured into initiating any lib-
eral policies if they did not serve his own ends.
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also held him responsible for things that he considered
ridiculously petty and which were no concern of his. In
general, he thought that the French people looked too much
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to the government to solve many of their problems,
A great deal can be said in defense of Napoleon III»s
reign on the basis of his liberalizing reforms that he brought
about on the domestic scene in hopes of raising the average
Frenchmen's standard of living, Ke fervently believed that
the common man had the right to his "just share of the
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national wealth,"
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Elihu B, Washburne, the American Minister to
France, who had been a lawyer in Illinois, and a
Republican Congressman from 1853 to 1869, Dt-ring
his Congressional period he had been the chairmein
of the Committee of Commerce besides heading the
Impeachment Committee of 1868, Although President
Grant appointed him Secretary of State, because
of certain physical disabilities he resigned the
post only a few days after being appointed. Short-
ly after he was appointed to the post of American
ambassador to France, which position he held from
1869 to 1877. During this period he viewed the
Paris siege of 1870-1871 and the following days
of the Paris Commune. FraJiklin Jameson, Diction-
ary of United States His tory. Boston: Puritan,
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Napoleon III at first saw no need for large numbers of
people to serve in the army, particularly since such a view
would not have been well received by the populace of France.
Consequently, when he came to power in 1852, rather than
reforming the lottery system, he further corrupted the
establishment by allowing each conscript to make a direct
payment of between 2,000 and 2,500 francs to the government
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instead of hiring a substitute. This not only lessened the
number of conscripts but also caused a deep feeling of
hostility among the lower classes. Thus, Napoleon III, as
had his uncle before him, acted against universal conscrip-
tion, only in the fleeting years of his reign did he see
the error of his earlier policy.
As a result of his policy the number of annual con-
scripts decreased to about 20,000. This group was made up
of the poorer classes who could not raise the required money
to save their sons from the disaster of having to spend
seven years in the army. Not only did Napoleon III»s policy
cause certain social stigma, but it added to his complete
dependency upon a mercenary force of about 260,000 volunteers,
who either reenlisted or were long service professional
soldiers. His complete reliance upon this elite profession-
al/^dwindled his reserve to an insignificant number since
only 20,000 men were being released from active duty each
59. Richard D. Challener, The French Theory of the^jation
Tn Arms . New York: Columbia University Press, 1955,
p. 13. Hereafter cited as Challener, Nation in Arms .
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year. Kis heavy spending for his exclusive Praetorian guard
did not even allow enough financial support for the training
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of the second part of the army as allowed for in the law
of 1832. This law stipulated that each year there would be
a certain number of men who would be drafted into the reserve
and never have to serve any time on active duty except for a
few weeks of training each year. Because of the lack of
finances this group of reservists never received any train-
ing whatsoever. This carelessness proved to be a decisive
factor in 1859.
The fact is that the military leaders of France during
the 1860 's lacked any real faith in the drafted soldier.
This, combined with the unwillingness of most Frenchmen to
serve seven years in the army, formed a strong force that
many individuals stronger than Napoleon III would have fail-
ed to change. Even Napoleon I, after his return from Moscow
in 1812, had riots, mutinies and whole-scale desfertion on
his hands when he re-established conscription. The army
leaders of the 1860 's considered only the "old soldier" as
having the qualities they thought necessary for a good army.
The long service soldier had what was referred to as the true
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military spirit, "1« esprit railitaire". This belief that
60. Kovacs, French Military Institutions , p. 223.
61, Challener, Nation in Arms , p. 15.
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the individual abilities of a soldier were much more im-
portant than the total number of men was most strongly
supported by Colonel Ardant du Picq. As the foremost
spokesman of this view during the 1860 's, du Picq spoke
a great deal from experience that he had acquired in the
Crimean War and the actions in Africa and Syria/^ What he
failed to realize was that these compaigns had been limited
conflicts, frequently against untrained natives or ill-
equipped troops. In all of these engagements there was
nothing that could have been considered a complete and full-
scale war between two evenly equipped and trained modern
armies. Therefore, the experiences of du Picq and many of the
other leading French military minds did not prepare them for
the type of warfare that they would be confronted with in
1870.
Du Picq even questioned Napoleon I»s view that the
number of troops under a commander's control was a decisive
factor in the outcome of a battle. To point this out he wrote
"Let us take Wagram, where his (Napoleon I) mass
was not repulsed. Out of 22,000 men, from 3,00C to
1,500 reached the position. Certainly the position
was not carried by them, but by the material and moral
effect of a battery of one hundred pieces, cavalry,
etc., etc. Were the 19,000 missing men disabled? No.
Seven out of twenty-two, a third, an enormous proportion,
may have been hit. What became of the 12,000 unaccount-
ed for? They had lain down on the road, had played
dummy in order not to go on to the end."^-^
62, Earle, Strategy
, p. 207,
63. Ibid,, p. 208.
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Du Picq supported this theory by pointing out that
defeat did not result from the initial shock of two armies
meeting, or the physical destruction that occurred, but only
when the moral fiber of one army began to disintegrate. Thus,
he believed, the greatest loss of life in battle took place
when one of the armies lost its morale and plunged into head-
long retreat. He supported his view when, after studying
various periods of military history, he concluded that the
answer to military victory was not military heroism but the
suppression of fear. His theory was that since all men are
afraid during combat, it was only the well disciplined troops
who suppressed this fear in the decisive moments when battles
were won or lost. Du Picq's acceptance of technological and
tactical changes as being secondary to the morale of troops
showed a vast difference from the Prussian emphasis on these
military areas. He considered them of only secondary import-
ance since both of these elements underwent continual change.
For this reason du Picq thought the only stable basis of a
good army must have been the morale and discipline of the
64
individual soldier. In essence, du Picq seemed to agree
with Napoleon I that certain technological and tactical
changes had to occur, yet he always believed that good military
discipline might carry the day in any case since it was not
susceptible to change as tactics were. Although du Picq
64. Ibid
. , pp. 210-212
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agreed on the surface with Napoleon on this point of change,
in reality he saw little need for it and thus supported the
same military tactics and system that the French had used
so blunderingly, yet luckily, in Italy, Africa, and Mexico.
Because of these beliefs, du Pica and the majority of
the leading military minds of France felt the need for a
well disciplined and well trained soldier who not only de-
veloped his professional ability but also established a
personal unity which was combined with the feeling of elite
pride and love of glory. This view of esprit de corps
continues to dominate many military minds, even down to the
present day.
The advantages of a professional army, compared to the
large conscripted armies with all their mob tendencies,
seemed obvious in 1860,
As a result, du Picq led the break with Napoleon I's
emphasis on numerical supremacy since he believed that war-
fare in the 1860 *s had changed a great deal since the early
1800 »s. Du Picq stated, "In these days of perfected long-
range arms of destruction a small force,... by a happy com-
bination of good sense or genius with morale or appliances
may,,,, secure heroic victories over a great force similarly
65
armed," This view combined with the fact that these leaders
lacked any faith in the ability of the reserves to fight also
hindered the development of an adequate reserve program that
might have supported the professional army when necessary.
65, Ibid,, p. 215
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The obvious break between the French military strategist
of 1870 and the principles of Napoleon I can best be sum-
marized by a few quotations from Colonel du Picq who stated:
"Just as formerly it was impossible to execute fireat command so it is today. Formerly no sight-settingwas possible; it is no better today.... ^
Man in the mass, in a disciplined body organized forcombat; IS invincible before an undisciplined body.But against a similarly disciplined body he reverts tothe primitive man who flees before a force proved strong-er, or that he feels stronger. The heart of the soldierIS always the human heart. Discioline holds enemiesface to face a little longer, but' the instinct of self-preservation maintains its empire and with it the senseof fear. Fear..,.
Man in battle,.,., is a being to whom the instinct
ot selt-preservation at times dominates everything
else. Discipline, whose purpose is to dominate thisinstinct by a feeling of greater terror, can not wholly
achieve it. Discipline goes so far and no farther. "66
One must realize that du Picq held many sound military
views, but with the help of historical hindsight his fail-
ures when compared to the principles of von Moltke and von
Roon become evident. Thus, it is important that we view
French military thought in the 1860 's within its own historic-
al period.
66. Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battles
.
Mew York: Macmillan Company, 1921, pp. 259, 255,
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This problem of conscription and a reserve program
remained a major problem of the French government ftom^
the late 1850 's right through to 1870. As we have seen the
lack of reserves in 1859 forced the French to withdraw from
the Italian campaign. Napoleon III subsequently tried to
reform the inactive reserve, but this attempt at reform
in 1861 must be considered a failure since the lack of re-
serves in 1866 again caused the French government great
embarrassment. It was during this period between 1866 and
1870 that France lost her last opportunity to develop an
adequate mass array that might have successfully opposed the
Prussian masses.
Napoleon III and Ollivier, his prime minister, both
realized the importance of numbers in a possible future war.
At the Saint Cloud conferences in 1866, Napoleon spoke of a
universal military system which might provide France with
its needed reserve. Although he realized the importance of
numerical superiority in a future war he found it necessary
67
to ask, "How are we going to get them?" Napoleon III*s
reluctance to impose universal conscription must be noted as
another of the indications that his administration had been
far weaker than his uncle's. Napoleon I had not been at all
hesitant to enforce even extreme conscription after his
disastrous defeat in Russia in 1812.
67. Challener, Nation in Arms , p. 17.
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At times in 1866 Napoleon III sounded as he had several
years earlier when he had attempted to build himself into
the image of the military genius similar to the status of
his uncle by praising the Prussian conscription system. With
the help of General Niel, the new Minister of War, Napoleon
proposed a new conscription program. All able-bodied French-
men, about 160,000 men, were to be drafted and diyided into
two classes each year. The long seven year duty would con-
tinue but those fortunate to be in the first class could
choose to end their active duty at the end of three years.
By this program Napoleon III showed that he supported un-
iversal conscription, but in practical application he con-
tinued its inequalities. In the end, he showed that he knew
the weakness of the French military system, yet pressures by
the military leaders and French society led to his failure
68
to bring about the needed reform, Niel was even more moder-
ate than Napoleon since he knew the strong views of the
various leading military minds who opposed the reform bill.
Their program did allow for the paying of a substitute, but
in any case when the individual hired a replacement to take
his place on active duty he himself still had to serve a
period of time in the reserve, Niel believed that this
program would continue the existing long term service but
support it with a much larger reserve base. However, Napoleon
68, Kovacs, French Military Institutions, p, 225.
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and Niel soon found their program a little extreme for both
69
the military and the general public to accept.
In general, the French military leaders strongly dis-
liked Niel's program. Du Picq, as would be expected, wrote
a book that was, in essence, a rebuttal of Niel«s emphasis
on military reserves. In the book, du Picq weighed the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of both a mass army of conscripts
and a small elite array of professional soldiers. Of course,
his conclusion was in favor of the small professional army;
70
'
a choice which later history proved quite inaccurate.
Various groups united with the military leaders to bring
severe pressure to bear on the deputies in the French legisla-
ture. Since Napoleon III did not have absolute control over
the chamber he was never able to get them to accept his pro-
gram completely. The typical view of the deputies can be
summed up in the comment that one of their members made at
the time, "Of course we shall be obligated to pass this
bill, but we shall fix it up in such a way that it will never
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work." Even though most Frenchmen in 1866 gloried in the
69. Challener, Nation in Arms, pp, 19-20,
70, Earle, Strategy , p, 20S.
This opposition would never have occurred in
the First Empire since Napoleon I would never
have allowed any question of his military decis-
ions. Du Picq*s view was much more to the liking
of various elements within French society because
it offered the least amount of change. It, of
course, offered most groups the easy way out and
as a result won quick popular approval,
7Xo Challener, Nation in Arms , p. 21.
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victories of Napoleon I, few if any had a desire for the
renewal of his campaigns. The Prussian victory at Sadowa
developed two contradictory feelings: that of hatred for
Prussia, and the desire for war; the second was that of
hatred of soldiering and the fight to remain free from it.
The draft program not only met resistance from the wealthy
who could no longer escape by payment, but surprisingly,
from the peasants who had enjoyed at least a gambling chance
previously of evading the draft altogether. The government
did its best to lessen the opposition to the reform and the
bill finally passed the chamber as expected. The impurities
of the law had decreased its opposition by various groups,
but the real test, that of application, enabled Napoleon
III*s opponents the chance to agitate violent riots against
72
his administration. In the final analysis, the only good
change which occurred as a result of the law was the ending
of the policy of exoneration which had been instituted under
Napoleon I, The bill itself did not bring about any change
in practice, and the result was that two years later the
French army that opposed the Prussians was in all aspects the
same one that Napoleon III had considered quite inadequate
73
earlier.
The only real result of the reform bill was that it
caused a great deal of restlessness with the reign of Napoleon
72. Gordon Wright,"Public Opinion and Conscription in France
1866-1870," Journal of Modern History . No. XIV,
March 1942, pp. 27-42, Hereafter cited as Wright,
Conscription in France
.
73. Challener, Nation in Arms , p, 27,
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III. Its military value was nonexistent and it only served
to weaken the Emperor's already declining hold on ^ oower74
in France,
Another factor which weakened the reform movement was
the death of Marshal Mel. The inadequate number of military
instructors to teach the National Guard units that existed
on paper, and the unwillingness of the French people to bear
the burden of part time military service made the French




Mot only were the French lacking in any concept of how
huge the numbers of combatants in a war with Prussia might
be, but they also lacked any detailed plan for war with
Prussia, Any French ideas on this subject were usually
confined to thoughts of quick and sudden victories for France.
The French plan, as far as one existed, counted heavily on
the tradition of friction between the southern German states
and Prussia, and the swiftness of French action to counter-
balance the numerical superiority of the Prussian troops.
This French plan was based on a loose agreement with Italy
and Austria whereby the French armies of about 150,000 men
were to cross the Rhine River at Germersheim and march into
Bavaria, This action was planned not only to separate the
northern and southern Germanic states but to provide the
74, Wright, Conscription in France , p. 45.
75, Boguslawski, Tactical Deductions , p, 29,
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necessary time needed for the Italian and Austrian armies to
76
join the French forces already in Bavaria, Once the three
armies were united under the command of a general previously
decided upon by the three countries, their total force would
number 300,000 men. About 35,000 Italians were to be sent to
occupy Munich while the rest of the armies were to start
toward FranlCfurt so as to establish a base for the future
77
campaign to occupy the rest of Germany. The plan also
provided that the strong French navy with war ships and
transportation carriers were to land a strong French force
in Northern Prussia which was to act in a holding manner
against the Prussian forces. The key factor in the French
plan was the quickness in which the major part of the French
army assembled around Alsace. However, as it later proved.
76, John F, C. Fuller, "The Period of German Consolidation,
1861-1871," in Gordon B. Turner, ed. , A History
of Military Affairs . Mew York: Harcourt, Brace
Company, 1953, p. 210, Also see appendix I..
The French army in 1870 probably had a much
better organization than it had had in 1796 but
the military leaders at this later date were
found lacking in the ways of military theory.
This can be seen in the French military's plan
to occupy . Prussia in 1870.
77. Oncken, Napoleon III , p. 205t206, Also see appendix II.
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the rail trcinsportation was found very inadequate and only
about 100,000 troops were able to be transported to Stras-
bourg, the center of the French preparations, while about
150,000 men had to leave the trains ^Metz until further
78
provisions could be made for them.
When Napoleon HI arrived at Metz, a week after the
start of the war, he found whole regiments incomplete, and
entire divisions had not been heard from. Napoleon, real-
izing the importance of an early French attack, ordered
his armies to attack, but his generals pointed out that
this would be impossible because of the various conditions.
Thus, France allowed its one chance for a quick military
victory to slip from its grasp. In the end, French leaders
realized that they would not be fighting an offensive war,
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but rather a defensive one.
The French military leaders in 1870 apparently failed
to recognize that the fundamental base of the Napoleonic
military tradition rested on the victorious offensive. If
they did recognize this principle they disregarded it, and
in addition disregarded the temperament of the individual
French soldier who was at his best in offense and hand to
hand fighting. Instead, the French leaders viewed the recent
developments of the"mi trailleuse"and the "chassepot" with
78. Moltke, Franco-German War , pp. 3-4.
79. Ibid., p. 5.
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their long range and rapid fire power as a growth toward
a defensive type of fighting emphasized by favorable positions.
Thus, the French military leaders failed to aceept the
Napoleonic tradition of offense and became entranced with
the military school of defensive positions.
^°
-rhe lack of an agency, a general staff, with a central
power to coordinate the various military movements can often
be decisive, as was possibly the case in France in 1870.
The comraand of the French armies fell to different individ-
uals at various times and often during disadvantagous periods.
All the French military commanders had to consider the im-
portance of Paris in any defensive plans and in this respect
they were forced to limit their thinking. These political
pressures upon the military tactics can best be illustrated
later when we view the fall of Sedan.
Although the French lacked all adequate preparations for
war France »s diplomatic actions previous to 1870 gave no
indication of these inadequacies. When France vetoed the
unification of the northern and southern Germanic states,
preventing the formation of a German confederation, old fears
were aroused in Germany, The old memories of their struggle
against Napoleon I and the futile attempts of Napoleon III to
gain concessions stirred a desire to »liberate' the Germanic
81peoples of Alsace-Lorraine, The first incident that would
80, Althara, Principles , p. 18.
81. Robert H. Lord, The Origins of the War of 1870
.
Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1924, pp, 10-11, Here-
after cited as Lord, War of 1870,
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set the stage for what finally burst in 1870, was laid in
1866.
By early 1870, Bismarck believed that Napoleon III
wanted the Germans to be in a position of accepting either
war or humiliation. His views of the fanatical remarks by
some of the French representatives in their chamber and by
the French press seemed to strengthen his opinion that war82
was inevitable. This belief on the part of Bismarck only
left little room for rational action.
When the Hohenzollern incident occurred the Paris news-
papers were filled with articles on how the French government
should have used force in preventing this German "outrage",
.
r . ^ 83even it it was necessary for France to go to war. The
moderation of a few French officials, led by Napoleon III,
seemed to act as a calming force during this early stage
of hysteria.
After a time it seemed that this incident had been
settled peacefully, but later, when the French Ambassador
Benedetti and the Prussian King William met, their meeting
became greatly exaggerated out of true proportions by various
French elements, apparently to stir and agitate the French
84
populace. On the Prussian side, Bismarck, who was at a
82. Emile Ollivier, The Franco^Prussian War and its Hidden
Causes
. Boston: Little, Brown Company, 1912, p. 461.
Hereafter cited as Ollivier, Franco-Prussian War
.
83. Washburne, Recollections, p. 29.
84. Ibid,, p. 33,
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meeting with von Moltke and von Roon, received the original
telegram from King William of Prussia telling of the meet-
ing between him and the French ambassador. All three Prus-
sians became discouraged that the last opportunity to go to
war with France was evaporating, Bismarck then hit upon
the scheme of editing the now famous Eras dispatch in a way
85
that would make war almost inevitable.
To the neutral observer it would appear that certain
powerful segments within French society were also wt
determined to have wa
r^^
along with their Prussian counter-
parts. The adventurers and plotters who surrounded the
Emperor seemed to have used their influence to arouse the
feelings for war. In all probability, Napoleon III never ,
wanted the war since he had recently been quite successful
in bring about a series of liberal reforms. The elements
that desired war with Prussia finally carried the day, and
war was declared.
After the declaration of war^ the firat months wes used
to try to build the unprepared French armies into successful
fighting units. The French troops were as brave and as
capable of patriotic sacrifice as their Prussian rivals.
It is incorrect to assume that the French troops lacked any
of the basic skills and valor of any other soldiers of this
85. Ollivier, The Franco-Prussian War , p. 482. Also see
appendix III,
86, Washburne, Recollections , p. 34.
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period. The fact was, however, that the campaign of 1870 was
a classic example of the uselessness of valor and patriotic
effort when there was a ^redt Le lack of technological and
military preparations, and a weakness of leadership. This
is even truer when the rival force has an efficient and
well oiled military machine that has kept attuned to the
recent scientific innovations through which maximum benefit
can be gained through the central control of an efficient
general staff.
Up until this time. Napoleon III had been successful
at getting the French people to view him as his uncle's
worthy successor. His name allowed him to gain military
acclaim when in reality he had little right to it. He had
based his true power on political diplomacy rather than
military ability. The generals to whom he frequently gave
command positions were loyal to him, or had become antiquated.
Although universal military training had been reinstituted
a huge section of the male population was still exempt from
conscription. The majority of the reserves who were to be
used to bolster the professional army wete inadequate. The
railroads were almost completely ill-prepared for mobiliza-
tion. Many of the minor military articles, like boots^ and
clothing^were missing. As the final inadequacy, decisive
above all previous points, there was found to be an utter
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THE WAR OF 1870
On July 23, 1870 the first Prussian division crossed
the French frontier, and began to march in the general
direction of St. Avoid. This could be considered the first
step in the systematic Prussian invasion of France. Napoleon
III assumed direct command of the French troops in the area
of St. Avoid. On July 31, when the French and Prussian
advance posts met in Saarbruck, the small skirmish that re-
sulted was viewed as a great French victory. The error of
Louis Napoleon in not demanding a continuous French drive in-
to southern Germany, despite the fact that his leading generals
had opposed it, lost the last opportunity the French had for
87
victory. Yet it was still feasible, if Napoleon III had
had the military ability of his uncle, for the French to
launch an attack with a force made up of a few infantry
divisions and Frossard's cavalry divisions, into some of the
Rhenish provinces. Thus, they could have blockaded Saar-
louis, driven back the weak Prussian forces in that area,
and established strong defensive positions around Kreuznach,
From these positions the French could have assaulted the
German forces, while hindering the movements of the larger
German army by destroying the railroads. These victories
would have given the French the precious time they needed
88
while improving French morale. This lack of French mobility
and preoccupation with defensive measures was to prove fatal.
87. Although it is unlikely that Napoleon I would ever have
allowed himself to be so ill-prepared; had he found
himself in the situation in 1870, it would be quite
doubtful that he would have missed the opportunity.
88. Soguslawski, Tactical Deductions, pp. 47-48.
64.
At the outbreak of the war the strongest element in favor
of the French was the bravery of the individual French soldier.
During the era of the first Napoleon the French fighting man
had proven himself capable and honorable. He continued this
tradition throughout the following years in the battles of
Sebastopol and Solferino and immediately preceding 1870.
The Germans who opposed the professional French troops,
until they nearly disappeared during the latter half of
1870, had great respect for the French infantry and real-
ized how ivell they deserved the reputation that tradition
89
had given them.
This well-founded confidence in the supremacy of the
French army was prevalent not only in France but in many
other areas, such as Luxembourg. When some Prussian troops
has shot the mayor of Wissembourg, the comment was made that
the French troops would very soon teach the Prussians a
90
lesson.
The optimistic Frenchman, even after the war, felt that
his nation still had had the chance of military victory.
This view pointed to the weakness of the military leadership
as the cause for the defeat in 1870. It was supposed that if
the French array had crossed the Saar with the numerical
superiority, which in theory it had until August 15th, Itey
could have defeated the Prussian troops in Palatinate before
89, Hohenlohe, Infantry
, p. 4.
90. W, H. Russell, My Diary During The Last Great War . New
York: Routledge, 1874, p. 55, Hereafter cited as
Russell, Pi ary ,
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von Moltke was able to implement his plan. This opinion
also reasoned that even after September 16th,had the French
leaders been intelligent enough to withdraw toward Paris
instead of Sedan,the results of the war could have been
quite different.
This great self-confidence on the part of Frenchmen in
general was one thing, but the same view on the part of the
French military leaders often led, a+ the start of the war,
to very lax reconnaissance. They failed to use their cavalry
for this purpose and thus neglected one of the basic Napoleon-
ic principles.
The German armies in 1870 made extensive use of their
cavalry for reconnoi tering purposes. Frequently, their
cavalry would move 15 to 20 miles in advance of the main
German units. This tactic was similar to that of K^apoleon
I who, when in doubt as to the enemy »s movements, would often
send out reconnoi tering cavalry with definite orders to take
enemy prisoners in order to learn of his opponent's movements.
The French, on the other hand, until they were surprised
by the Prussians at Beaumont, frequently allowed the German
reconnaissance units to get close enough to the French camp
93
so that they could see the French activities in detail.
91. Ollivier, The Franco-Prussian War , pp. 395-396.
92. C. F. Clery, Minor Tactics
.
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In other respects, however, the cavalry was not used
extensively by either side in the Franco-Prussian War,
Although the German cavalry did an outstanding job of observ-
ing the French army movements they were rarely used to their
full potential as an attacking force against enemy infantry.
Occasionally, small numbers of cavalry were used in coordina-
.
tion with other elements of the army, However, large numbers
of cavalry were seldom used e,s they had been earlier. Napoleon
I used large masses of cavalry divided into four or six
regiments, iniiich frequently attacked in two or three lines
almost equal in numbers, Bonaparte usually attacked dis-
organized infantry at timely intervals with devastating
results. The chaos which existed on the battlefields in 1870
could have similarly been used to advantage by the use of
large cavalry forces. The factor of surprise, plus the
excellent natural cover found in the region of the fighting
in 1870^ could have provided either the French or German
94
cavalry with good opportunities for favorable attacks.
In any case, neither side used the cavalry as successfully
as it might have been used.
On August 6th the French military suffered two defeats.
The first occurred when the Germans drove Marshal MacMahon
from the heights around Worth while dealing him a loss of
6,000 men. During the same day. General Frossard*s troops,
94, Ibid , , pp. 372, 374-375.

67.
who held a strong defensive position above Saarbruck, were
driven in mass confusion towards Metz by another German
army. After the French forces regrouped in the vicinity of
Metz they fought several unsuccessful battles around Metz
with only small losses. Finally, Marshal Bazaine ordered
the retreat of the French forces from Metz to Verdun, but
during the retreat his army suffered a defeat near Grave-
lotte,
BATTLE OP MARS-LA-TOUR
During this phase of the fighting, Bazaine failed to
abide by Napoleon I»s rule of thumb which emphasized the
importance of avoiding any unnecessary delay in time of
battle, because in certain instances a single day»s delay
of plans could be disastrous. In all probability, Bazaine
could have escaped from Metz if the Prussian 1st and 2nd ar-
mies-; had followed through with their plan to rest on August
15th. It becomes evident that in this case the Prussians
were following the Napoleonic strategy, while on the other
hand Bazaine made the blunder of delaying his withdrawal one
95
complete day, thereby making the French withdrawal extreme-
ly treacherous.
By August 14th the French army, under Bazaine, was
located east of Metz confronting the German 1st army, while
95. Baron von Goltz, The Conducts of War
. Kansas City, Mo.
Franklin Hudson Company, 1896, p. 67, Hereafter
cited as Goltz, Conducts.
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the German 2nd army was advancing on Moselle to the south.''
Only the slowness of Bazaine's reaction to von Koltke's
over-extended advance guard saved it from being isolated and
destroyed, m this instance von Moltke was saved from destruc
tion by the individual action of some of his subordinates, and
seems to have unwittingly made use of the Kapoleonic principle
of the necessity of an advance guard furiously attacking the
enemy, thereby drawing their attention and allowing for
greater flexibility in the movements by the larger part of
the army.
On August 16th, the Prussian vanguard attacked the French
army, commanded by Bazaine, thinking that it was merely the
rearguard for the French withdrawal to the north. When
Prince Frederick Charles arrived on the scene and realized
that his army was opposed by Bazaine »s entire 140,000 men,
he ordered that continuous pressure be applied by the German
left flank while the right flank held its position, Although
the Prussian advance guard had over-extended itself^ their
good system of communications facilitated the swift movement
of troops into the areas desir^ At times it may have appear-
ed that the German 1st and 2nd armies were moving in a line
not connecting the 3rd army, but in reality they had a common
base on the Rhine River, from Coblentz to Germersheim, while
96, Ibid
., p. 124.
97, Clausewitz, On War
.
Vol. I, p, 264.
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their flankers were never farther than one day»s march from
each other. Although when the complete armies confronted
each other the French were usually numerically inferior,
they seldom made any attempt to concentrate a more numerous
force in a particular area, which would have enabled them to
99
separate and aefeat the isolated German forces. This short-
coming is ber.t illustrated during the battle on August 16th
at Mars-la-Tour. The German right flank firmly held its
position with the help of heavy artillery while occasion-
ally attempting to defeat small sections of the French line.
Bazaine concentrated most of his reinforcements in this
area since he feared that he might be cut off from Metz.
Due to the great number of German artillery pieces on this
flank, all attempts by the fresh French troops in this sector
100
were in vain.
This situation had resulted because of Bazaine *s late
decision to move in the direction of Verdun, but the decision
also over-extended the German forces who were trying to cut
off the French route to Verdun. The German 2nd Corps at
Flavigny faced not only the French Batailles division of the
French 2nd Corps, but also the entire 6th Corps. The German
3rd Corps was not only completely committed but had previous-
ly suffered heavy casualties in earlier fighting. The only
99. Edward B. Haraley, The Operations of War . London: Black-
wood and Sons, 1878, p. 324. Hereafter cited as
Hamley, Operations .
100. Whitton, Decisive Battles , p. 154.
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other German Corps close enough to provide any assistance
the loth Corps, was still a great distance away. The French
forces at this ti™e were also being strengthened by the
arrival of the 3rd and 4th Corps and. as a result, could
easily have swept the German left flank while rolling up
the German line as it moved forward. The only thing the
French needed was a commander who had the vision to see and
understand the complex situation, and then give the necessary
orders which could only have climated in victory, m any
case. Bazaine, because of the hugeness of the conflict, was
unable to rise to the opportunity. He was thinking more
along the lines of a defensive strategy and greatly feared
that his base of operations, Metz. would be cut off.^°^
During the fighting the German left flank remained
fluid for the entire day. About half of the German 19th
Division of the 10th Corps arrived in the vicinity of Mars-
la-Tour and was immediately ordered to assist the German
3rd Corps by attacking the French right flank. This half
of the 10th Division, made up of five battalions of Guard
Dragoons, advanced across almost completely open ground
in front of the French right flank. Within a short period
this German force was shattered, with its remmants falling
back to Tronville. The French attempted to follow up their
success but their hesitancy to throw in greater numbers of
103
71.
reinforcements made their attempt preordained to failure.
A little later. General von Rheinbaben, colander of the
German 5th Cavalry Division attempted to envelop^the French
right wing. Although the French had almost three full
cavalry divisions located nearby they failed to make maximum
use of all of their forces by holding many in reserve. As
a result, the French were forced to withdraw to Bruville
while the Prussians had won the important element of time.
The remaining day was primarily of a stationary nature with
both sides making occasional assaults on each other's
posi tions.
I^ie importance of the battle of Mars-la-Tour was that the
French military leaders missed a great opportunity. The fewer
German forces not only successfully stopped the French retreat
but allowed enough time for the main German force to intercede
between the two French armies of Bazaine and MacMahon, thus
ending the French hope of combining their two armies.
^^'^
Bazaine had failed to dislodge the German advance guard and
had decided against a more circuitous route west and thus
fell back under the covering guns of Meti:. After the battle
of Gravelotte on August 18th the French army, commanded by
102. Envelopment is an attack made on one or both of the
enemy »s flanks or rear, usually accompanied by an
attack on his front,
103. Whitton, Decisive Battles
, pp. 154-155,
104. Ibid
. . p. 156.
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aazaine, had been fairly well cut off from the rest of France"!
The fact remained that the German view, even after
August 18th, was not ,o optimistic as most observers would
have believed. The official German account of this period
of the fighting indicated that Bazaine still had excellent
opportunities to break out of Metz as late as August 31st.
If this account was accurate, how much more favorable would
his chances have been eleven or twelve days earlier when
the German forces were extremely scattered in the south, is
open now only to speculation. This German account describes
the possibility on August 31st of Bazaine»s breakout from
Metz to the south as follows:
"Far fewer difficulties were presented by the local
conditions to the south of Metz. A forward movement
on this side would find in that terrain, as on the
northeast, a large space for development upon bothbanks of the Seille, along the three great roads toSoigne, Nomeny, and Cheminot. Should the bulk of the
army of the Rhine make a sudden dash along these roads,
while a left detachment shaped its course for Courcelles
sur Nied; and a second, under the protection of the
fortress-artillery, showed front towards Ars and Jouy
somewhere in the neighborhood of Frescaty, in order
to detain the VII and VIII Prussian Corps in the pass-
age of the Moselle, there was, in view of the position
at that time of the investing army, and that too with-
out any very severe struggle. It is true that the
French leaders would have been forced in any case to
abandon their trains, and even then would have been
sooner or later threatened in flank and rear by the
forward pressure of the Corps of the investing army.
But Marshal Bazaine might hope in all cases to find
his line of march at any rate open, to sever temporari-
ly the but weakly guarded communications of the
Germans, and, although not without considerable dif-
ficulties as to supply, to escape with a large part of
his army to the southward. "J-Oo
105, Goltz, Conduct
, p. 125.




As previously mentioned, when Marshal MacMahon took
comraand of the retreating French troops who had been beaten
at Geisburg, and ordered them to re-group and fight at Worth
on August 6th, approximately 32,000 French troops met the
40,000 Prussians at Worth, Eventual German victory quickly
became evident due to the Prussians' superiority of numbers.
In this clash, as in many of the previous ones, the Prussians
continued to be victorious, but also lost many men because
they continued to charge in mass formations.
The Germans would frequently carry the day on sheer
numbers alone no matter what kind of superior position or
courage the French troops showed. MacMahon, with his small
army slightly reinforced, fell back from Worth and retreated
toward Nancy. As MacMahon slowly withdrew, it became evident
that the famous French legend concerning French ability to
improvise was not entirely untrue. Nearly 100,000 troops
from various groups were gathered with their equipment under
the command of MacMahon, In all probability, the number
and valor of these men were adequate, but supplies of med-
icine, communications and artillery were either^ totally lack-
ing or insufficient. With a great commander of the stature
of Napoleon I this army, with its nucleus of trained profes-
sional infantrymen, could have taken a heavy toll of the
107, Moltke, The Franco-German War, p. 12.
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German forces. Even a leader of far less ability than
Napoleon I should have been able to hold his position at
least long enough for Bazaine to start an offensive action,
and possibly long enough for a third French army to be108
formed in Paris. Had not Napoleon I during his last
Hundred Days, and in fact after his defeat in 1812, used the
same type of raw recruit to hold the larger more experienced
armies of the allies to a stand^still? m any case, MacMahon
was not Napoleon 1, and tbereiore it ir, ^rob, Mv unfair to
fiui. .e the COM' aricion,
MacMahon's first plan to fight a delaying action while
retreating from Chalons had to be changed when Comte de
Palikao, Minister of War, telegraphed that a revolution
would take place in Paris if MacMahon abandoned Bazaine.
Not desiring to act against the orders of Palikao, MacMahon
ike
ordered his army to march towardAMeuse with the chance that
Bazaine might be able to unite with him. This interference
by politicians could never have occurred under Napoleon I
since political repercussions seldom influenced his military
strategy. Napoleon I was concerned, first and foremost, with
military tactics, as Moltke showed himself to be in 1870.
As a result, weak politics had left France unprepared for war;
weaker politics were then to destroy possibly the last chance
that France had of averting defeat.
108. Howard, The Franco-Prussian War, p. 185.
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MacMahon not only was weakened by various political
pressures on him, but also apparently forgot one of Napoleon
I»s key tactical maneuvers; avoiding the danger of a flank-
ing movement while within striking distance of the enemy,
MacMahon»s retreat, which was of a defensive nature, from
Meuse on August 30th, 1870 was completely opoosite^^^Tapoleon
109
Bonaparte »s retreat from Leipzig in 1813. Napoleon I had
110
always argued that the use of a flank march when within
attacking aistance of the enemy was completely foolish,
although sometimes more convenient than the traditional
column movement. MacMahon broke this tactic when he used
a flank ruarch in front of the enemy position held by the
German Crown Prince. MacMahon had hoped he could force
march his troops to Sedan so that they might be united
with the forces under Bazaine. Because his troops could
not move as quickly as was necessary, MacMahon *s force was
stopped and then attacked while in the flanking movement.
This blunder was to lead to the disaster of Sedan which
111
soon followed.
109, Clausewitz, On War , Vol, I, p, 304,
Napoleon I, with about 35,000 men, could possibly
have avoided the battle that resulted at Hanau by
trying to pass the Rhine at either Coblenz or Man-
nheim, Instead he proved that certain elements,
such as the defense of a chosen terrain, could prove
quite advantageous to a retreating army. On Oct, 30,
1813, the Bavarian army of 50,000 tried to block
his retreat at Hanau, By the brillant use of his
artillery he blew apart the enemy lines and con-
tinued his withdrawal,
110, Flank march takes place when a unit moves to the left or right.
111, Clausewitz, On War , Vol, I, p. 88.
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On August 31st, the German army overtook MacMahon's troop
a short distance north of the Rheims River. After a fierce
battle they drove the French army toward Sedan. During the
entire day there was a continuous series of bloody skirmishes
as the French troops, pressed on every side, fell back ex-
112
hausted into Sedan,
September 1st found the French surrounded and all avenues
of escape cut off. They were crowded together in a narrow
area, v;hile five hundred Prussian artillery pieces fired at
113
point blank range.
Above all things, the German victory at Sedan was a
German artillery victory over French artillery. The French
paid no attention to the Napoleonic principle of massing
artillery pieces for concentrated fire power and, as a result,
were completely silenced by the German guns, hot only did
the French use their artillery by independent batteries,
but they even failed to have any conceivable plan or pattern
114
in which these batteries were to be used. With this victory
of the German artillery, came the collapse of the French
resistance.
112. John Abbott, Prussia and the Franco-Prussian War. Boston:
B. B, Russel, 1871, p. 241. Hereafter cited as
Abbott, Prussia , p
113. Moltke, The Franco-German War , p. 256.




When MacMahon was wounded at Sedan he was succeeded
by Marshal Ducrot as comraander of the French troops. Just
as Ducrot was to attempt to break out of Sedan he was re-
lieved of his command by General VJimpffen, who brought new
orders from the War Minister in Paris. Wimpffen failed to
take stock of the existing situation until it was too late^^^
This incident merely shows how the continual political
pressures from Paris hindered the military effort of the
men doing the fighting.
After twelve hours of this unequal struggle, the French
commanders reported to the emperor that they could no longer
116
offer serious resistance. When surrender became inevitable,
Napoleon III assumed full responsibility and ordered the
French to surrender.
In all reality the fall of Sedan meant the end of the war,
and any chajice that France might have had to be victorious.
Bismarck, on the following day, September 3, 1870, fully sum-
marized the facts in a letter to his wife: "Yesterday and the
day previous, therefore, have cost France a hundred thousand
men and an Emperor. Today the latter, with all his attend-
ants, horses, and carriages, have started for Wilhelmshc)he
near Cassel. This is a great historical event - a victory
for which we must humbly give God the glory, and which ends
the war, even if we have to carry it further against the
117
country deprived of its leaders,"
115, George F. Henderson, The Science of War, Yorkshire-Lan-
caster Regiment: Gale Pollelk, 1891, pp. 401-402,
116, Abbott, Prussia , p, 256,
117, Hayward, Bismarck, pp, 274-275.
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CAUSES OF DEFEAT
The eighteenth century military theorists, led by
Napoleon I, had constantly striven for great speed and
decisiveness in warfare. Although Napoleon I had success-
fully used this type of warfare in achieving military victor,
ies, he had failed to establish a lasting peace in Europe
for various other reasons. Napoleon I never desired a
balance of forces within Europe; rather he had tried to
set up a system of peace dependent upon himself and his
military victories. This could not last since the peace
was entirely dependent on Napoleon who, as a human being,
could not live forever. It was also questionable if France,
the nation, had the ability or desire to sustain this type
of peace for any l^thy period. The failure of Napoleon I
to limit the power and the influence of Great Britain must
also be considered one of the leading reasons forj'not achiev-
ing peace in Europe. The continued independence of England
allowed her to assist both Napoleon»s domestic and foreign
enemies. Napoleon III, on the other hand, trying to apply
the Napoleonic tradition of a Europe dominated by France,
met many of the same difficulties that his uncle had met
before him. Although Napoleon III lacked the military
decisiveness of his uncle, his army had done an adequate job
in consolidating French influence up to 1870. In fact,
Napoleon III out did his uncle when he realized the error
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of not containing English influence. This neutralization
of active British support of France's enemies became one of
the mainstays of Napoleon IIl»s foreign policy. Only in the
latter stages of his reign did he fail to cultivate the
friendship of Britain. This point proved decisive since it
assured British neutrality during 1870-1871 even though the
majority of the British populace sympathized with the French
nation. Bismarck not only tried to continually avoid any
friction with Britain, but he also tried after the German
victory to create a peace that was, at least on the surface,
based not only on military conquest, but also had a facade of
having the general consent of the people. Although he failed
on this point, primarily because of the nlsace question, the
fact remains that the only reason that Moltke»s military
victories were not to remain isolated battles was due entire-
ly to the great statesmanship of Bismarck. The peace he
arranged did not last forever, but it was successful over
a short period of time.
It is incorrect to conclude that the only cause of the
French defeat in 1870 was wholly the responsibility of the
French military. The French defeat in 1870, similar to that
of the Prussians at Jena in 1806, v;as the product of many
and various elements within both societies. The Prussians
in 1806 were a classic example of a highly disciplined, elite
118, Howard, The Franco-Prussian War, p, 454,
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army which was the product of its Junker society. Napoleon
I, with his new applications of warfare, such as the use of
mass armies, showed the Prussians the necessity change.
In 1870, the roles were exactly reversed. Von Moltke, with
his new innovations, showed the French people that their
18th century army left a great deal to be desired. Even
though the French army was one of the best fighting forces
of the period it was obvious that in the future it had
to be patterned along the modern 19th century lines of the
Prussian army. The success of the Third Republic indicates
not only a political change after 1870, but also a social
change. Many Frenchmen woke to the reality that Prussia had
not only gained on France militarily, but also culturally,
economically, and technologically; whereas the nation under
Napoleon III had remained rather stationary in various areas
in addition to the military.
If the French military was not the only cause of French
defeat in 1870, in all probability it must bear the major-
ity of the burden. Most of the military minds followed the
lead of a few outstanding individuals like du Picq, while
their personal experiences in France s various campaigns
reinforced these views. As a child is limited in his
development to his environment, so also were the French
military leaders limited to their own experiences. The
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isolated battles and campaigns against various backward
peoples were not conducive to the development of many new
military tactics. In all of these earlier campaigns the
valorous tradition of heroism of the French soldier which
went back to the Napoleonic Era, continued without break.
The most important quality that the French army lacked in
1870, as was previously seen in light of earlier campaigns,
was in the area of military theory. The regulations that
governed the French army during 1870 were none other than
those that the Prussians had discarded after the battle of
Jena in 1806. Due to the fact that France »s armies had a
continuous chain of victories, starting from the most im-
pressive in 1854, the French military considered itself the
119
best in the world.
The real weakness of the French army lay in the fact that
it completely lacked any advanced and sophisticated course in
tactics for its officers. Since the only courses French
officers did receive were of a basic introductory nature few
officers rose to anything more than subordinate field officers
in their knowledge of military strategy and tactics. When
it came time to appoint commanders it was necessary to appoint
individuals who were probably quite qualified on the lower
practical levels, but who were completely unschooled in a
knowledge of general tactics. In fact. Napoleon III, because
119. Emile Laloy," French Military Theory," The Military Hist
orian and Economist , Vol, II, No, 3, July 1917, p,
267, Hereafter cited as Laloy, Theory .
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he felt it necessary to play the role of heir to his uncle»s
military genius, TA*iile in reality he knew little about military
theory, avoided a great deal of conversation on military
tactics that might possibly have shown his ignorance in
that area. Because of this, it frequently became necessary
for the military commanders to rely on flash inspirations in
time of battle, rather than on previous tactical plans that
120
had not been formulated in any great detail.
During 1870 French strategists seemed unmindful of the
changes that had taken place since the time of Napoleon
Bonaparte, These developments were readily absorbed by the
Germans who realized more fully the effect of the breech
121
loading rifle on both tactics and movement of troops.
These Prussian insights and subsequent improvement in their
military strategy and organization, while the French re-
mained completely static, were important factors in the
outcome of the war between the two countries.
120. Ibid , , p, 268,
121, 3oguslawski, Tactical Deductions, p, 175,
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CONCLUSION
The fighting in 187r, started with both nations possess-
ing professional armies and, at least nominally, ready for
war. The commands on both sides made various miscalculations
and mistakes, but the Germans took advantage of their enemy's
errors more than did the French. Despite the fact that the
German plan of attack was not at all sophisticated or subtle,
122
and relied on sheer massing of force, it was victorious.
This war^ iaust be considered one of the most bitter,
decisive, and most consequential wars of Europe since the
days of Napoleon I. To Germany this war still represents
123
some of the most glorious chapters of its national history;
whereas to France this period stands out as one of the most
humiliating in its long national history.
In the final analysis, it would seem that it was the
Napoleonic military system and tradition, developed, pruned,
and efficiently used by the German military leaders, that
124
quickly crushed the French armies in 1870.
The military genius of von Moltke was, in a sense, not
as great as that of Napoleon I. Moltke *s main interest and
ability lay in the fact that he could develop excellent
general tactics, and was able to organize an administration
122. Liddell Hart, Strategy . New York: Praeger, 1962, p. 154.
123. Lord, War of 1870 . p. 3.
124. F. N. Maude, Letters on Tactics and Organization . Kansas
Spooner, 1891, p. 35.
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that could carry out these tactics. In a true sense he was
the first of the great modern generals. The German victories
were not due to the immediate commanders, as the Napoleonic
victories of 1800-1814 had been. The German military strength
came from a detailed military organization, better military
education of their officers, and from their frequent numerical
superiority. These very characteristics were to become the
most important concern of the modern armies today. The
importance of numerical superiority forced the demise of the
small elite professional armies of the past. Instead, the
German system of a "nation in arms" revolutionized the military
tradition in Europe, so that the entire male population of
a nation was trained, armed, and could be concentrated at
125
any one point within a few days. Many of these qualities
of a modern army can easily be viewed as the logical out-
come of Napoleonic tactics.
The responsibilities of the war itself must rest with
both sides. In the case of France, the Napoleonic tradition
made war almost inevitable by its continuing policy of
frustrating the attempts at unification by the southern and
northern Germanic states. France had intervened in German
domestic affairs after the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 in
an effort to prevent such unification.
Napoleon Ill^during the later stages of his government^
allowed French leadership to fall into the hands of Ollivier
125. Howard, The Franco-Prussian War, p. 455.
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and Gramont, who were a poor match for the crafty Bismarck,
If Napoleon III had been at his peak of power, as he had
been during the early 1850 's, the turn of events might
have been different. What occurred under Napoleon lU
would probably not have taken place under his uncle, since
the first Napoleon could never bring himself to designate
any great amount of power to any of his subordinates. In
ordinary times Napoleon III probably would have been the
most powerful force in Europe, but as an opponent of Bis-
marck, he was found lacking. Napoleon Ill's error was not
entirely due to his lack of military knowledge, but was due
largely to the fact that by the late 1860 's he lacked the
true complete authority of a dictator. However, because
many considered him so, it was necessary for him to accept
the mistakes that did not entirely belong to him. In all
reality, he was the product of his times: the results of the
desires of the French people to continue the glorious myth
of the Napoleonic Empire. On the other hand, they refused
to support it financially or militarily to the extent that
would have made it a success. The difference between the
two Napoleons in this area was notic^ble in that Napoleon
III asked for the people's support, while Napoleon I demand-
ed it.
In addition, the military leaders themselves failed to
hold true to the Napoleonic tradition at its best. They
86.
lacked the foresight to realize the important lessons of
Napoleon I and, in fact, in several instances acted in com-
plete opposition to the old master. Perhaps this failure is
basically due to the well worn rule that few men ever realize
the importance of various things which they have grown and
developed beneath their own roof. Possibly they thought
that since the Napoleonic tradition belonged to them it
would remain with them forever despite changing conditions
and times. The French military leaders had failed to hold
true to Napoleon I»s most precious principle: the constant
need for change of military strategy to fit the different
situations. They were only pragmatic to the point that they
concluded that their victories in 1854, 1859 and 1862 were
good enough examples of their military prowess to preclude
the necessity for any change. These same military leaders
failed to see the underlying weakness of most of these
victories.
In any case, both Napoleon III and the French military
strategists merely reflected the French society of their
time, to a lesser or greater degree. In the final analysis,
the blame must fall on French society for the failure of the
Napoleonic tradition during the Second Empire, The French
people paid lip service to the glories of the First Empire
and the military victories of the first Napoleon, However,
had Napoleon III tried to continue his uncle's exploits on a
great scale he probably would have met strong opposition
and possibly even been overthrown. The result was a feeling
87.
that prevailed throughout French society, the government, and
the military which was conducive to an exterior of glamor and
glitter, although beneath the surface lay laxness and dis-
interest. I am inclined to agree with the general trend
among many recent historians that the positive aspects of the
reign of Louis Mapoleon outweighed the negative points. Had
his years ended with victory insteaa of defeat, earlier
historians would have been much more likely to have consider-
126
ed his reign a success,
Prussia, in all probability, carried out the Napoleonic
tradition much farther than the very country that had borne
its founder. In the form of Bismarck, Prussia had a man who
was probably even more brilliant than Napoleon I diplomatical-
ly. Bismarck believed as fervently as Bonaparte that any
device should be used to reach the desired ends. Although
both men probably emphasized this pragmatic approach, Bismarck,
being more skilled in the use of these diplomatic tools,
would have won the fervent approval of Napoleon I. Von Moltke,
on the other hand, was probably not as skilled a military
genius as was Bonaparte, yet he finished the required job
efficiently and successfully. Moltke, while a more conservative
militarist than Napoleon Bonaparte, would probably have been
Napoleon *s equal in the modern warfare of the 19th century.
126. Spitzer, Napoleon III , pp. 308-310.
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It is quite possible that Moltke might even have beaten
Napoleon I on the modern battlefield, since warfare had
become a science and the best commander was frequently the
one most skilled with the various tools of modern warfare
and having the ability to organize them so that maximum
efficiency could be acquired.
The Franco-Prussian War saw the arming of huge masses
of men with weapons that had been provided by the recent
growth of industrialization. They were led to war by military
leaders who had absorbed and improved upon the traditions and
strategies of Napoleon Bonaparte. Modern war had been made
possible, and the era of Napoleon I, when one individual
could do all jobs well, had come to an end. The time of the
specialist had begun, with the need for a commander-in-chief




Emperor Napoleon III to General Lebrun on the general plan
of war.
November, 1869
"Oh, reprit l»Empereur, on pourrait pourtant etablir
ce plan sans y faire entrer d« alliance sures ou probables.
Mais, au surplus, il serait permis de considerer I'alliance
d 'Italic, comme certaine, et celle de I'Autriche comme
^ 127
assuree raoralement, sinon activement,"
127. Cncken, Napoleon III , p. 204,
90.
APPENDIX II
cnnn^,-/^^^''^''^^ °" deliberations of the French
nrin'the ^hair! ''''' "'^^ ^^^^^ ^a^ole'^r
.^.."L»Iimpereur exprimait ensuite son opinion personelle, se
declara favorable k un plan de campagne qui reposerait sur les
donnees suivantes.
. .
.La guerre etant declar^e. trois armies,
de 100,000 hommes chacune, I'une fran^aise, une autre autrich-
ienne et la troisieme italienne, envahiraient aussitot la
territoire du midi de 1 'allemagne. Les trois armees auraient
pour premier objectif un point central du territoire de ces
Etats. Elles s»y concentreraient sous le commanderaent d»un
generalissirae designe d'avance par les trois souverains
interesses. Sur les 300,000 hommes reunis ainsi, un corps de
30 a 40,000 Italiens serait jete a Munich pour occuper, en
permanence, cette capitale de la Baviere. Au moyen de ces
premieres dispositions, on pouvait esperer que l«on detacherait
de la Prusse les forces de la Baviere, du Wurtoraberg et du
Grand-Duche de Bade.... Ce premier resultat obtenu, I'arraee
alliee, diminuee des 40,000 Italiens laisses a Munich, se
dirigerait vers le haut Mein pour aller prendre pied en
Franconie et s»y etablir sur une base d'operations s»entendant
de Wurtzbourg a Nuremberg ou Amberg. C»est de cette base
qu»elle partirait ensuite pour commencer les grandes operations
128
de la campagne."
128. Ibid., pp. 205-206
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APPENDIX III
The Ems dispatch sent from the King of Prussia, July 13,
1870, to Bismarck. The original version, Ko, 27, No, 61,
reads as follows:
"M. Benedetti accosted me on the promenade, in order to
demand of me - most importunately, at last, that I should author-
ize him to telegraph to Paris that I bind myself for all future
time never again to give my consent if the Hohenzollerns renew
that candidature. I repelled him at last somewhat severly,
for one may not and cannot make such commitments for ever and
ever (a tout jamais). Naturally, I informed him that I had
received no news as yet, and, since he had been informed earlier
than I by way of Paris and Madrid, he could easily understand
that my Government had no hand in the matter.
Since then His Majesty has received a dispatch from the
Prince (Charles Anthony). As His Majesty has informed Count
Benedetti that he was expecting news from the Prince, His
Majesty, because of the above mentioned demand, decided, in
consonance with the advice of Count Eulenberg and mine, not
to receive the French envoy again, and informed him through
an aide-de-camp on duty that His Majesty had received from
Paris, and had nothing further to say to the Ambassador. His
Majesty leaves it to your excellency to determine whether or
not this new demand of Benedetti *s and its rejection should
not be communicated without delay to our representatives and
129
to the press."
129. Ollivier, The Franco-Prussian War, p. 482.
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3ismarck»s edited version of the Ems Dispatch sent tn th.German representatives and press reads as follows!
^
"After the news of the renunciation of the hereditary
Claim of the Prince of Hohenzollern had been officially com-
municated to the imperial goverment of Spain, the French
Ambassador at Ems made an additional demand of His Majesty,
that he should authorize him to telegraph to Paris that His
Majesty the King bound himself for all future time never
again to give his consent if the Hohenzollerns renew that
candidature. His Majesty the King thereupon decided not to
receive the French envoy again, and informed him through
an aide-de-camp on duty that His Majesty had nothing further
130
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